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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. 
corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives 
provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the 
number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ horizon incentives and 
using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the 
firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate 
executives’ horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal 
governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity including a 
difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal 
governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate 
executives’ contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the 
capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in 
the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal 
governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the 
members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management.1 
Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide 
checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions.2 We focus on key 
subordinate executives, or specifically the top four executives with the highest compensation 
other than the CEO, because we hypothesize that they are the most likely group of employees 
that have both the incentive and the ability to influence the CEO in corporate decisions. As 
argued in Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011), key subordinate executives have strong incentives 
not to take actions that increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term firm value. 
This tradeoff between current and future firm value is particularly salient in the case of real 
earnings management because overproduction and cutting of R&D expenditures are costly and 
can reduce the long-term value of the firm (e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Bhojraj, 
Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In addition, we expect these key 
subordinate executives to have more direct impact on corporate decisions, such as research and 
development, production, and other activities that affect operating cash flows, and as a result, the 
extent of real earnings management. In contrast, these executives, with the exception of the CFO, 
have little direct influence on the accrual process. Thus, we focus on real earnings management 
in this paper.  
The motivation for the research question is two-fold. First, the majority of the papers in the 
literature explicitly or implicitly assume that the CEO is the sole decision maker for financial 
                                                            
1 Following Roychowdhury (2006, 336), we define real earnings management as “management actions that deviate 
from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds.” 
Some papers in the literature refer to “real earnings management” as “real activities management.”  
2 We use the term “internal governance” to be consistent with some of the closely related studies (e.g., Acharya et al. 
2011). We refer to governance mechanisms other than the monitoring by the key subordinate executives broadly as 
“other governance mechanisms.”  
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reporting quality, which includes both accrual and real earnings management.3 Focusing only on 
the CEO does not provide a complete picture because firm management is typically a shared 
effort of all top executives (Finkelstein 1992). Recent literature starts to examine how CFOs 
affect the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010; Feng, Ge, Luo, and 
Shevlin 2011). However, the impact of other executives has been largely overlooked. As 
discussed briefly below and in detail in Section II, recent studies argue that subordinate 
executives usually have longer decision horizons and they can influence corporate decisions 
through various means. We hypothesize that differential preferences arising from differential 
horizons can affect the extent of real earnings management.  
Second, while there are studies focusing on the impact of various corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate decisions (e.g., board independence and institutional ownership), little 
is known about whether there are checks and balances within the management team. This lack of 
knowledge is an important omission because control is not just imposed from the top-down or 
from the outside, but also from the bottom-up (Fama 1980).  
Key subordinate executives usually care more about the long-term firm value than the CEO 
for several important reasons. First, as argued in Acharya et al. (2011), some of these executives 
desire to become the CEO in the future. As candidates for the CEO position in the future, key 
subordinate executives care about cash flows that the firm can generate in the future, which are 
in turn a function of the firm’s current investments. As a result, these executives are less likely to 
sacrifice long-term investments to meet short-term earnings targets. Second, key subordinate 
executives have more to lose relative to their total wealth from corporate underperformance than 
the CEO. They are usually younger and have more remaining years of employment. As such, the 
                                                            
3 Some papers pool all top five executives covered in the ExecuComp database together and examine their collective 
influence on financial reporting (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005). The distinct impact of other executives is not 
identified in such analyses.  
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potential loss of income for failing to find a comparable job in the future is high for younger 
executives and increases with horizon. Third, Fama (1980) argues that in general, a manager’s 
outside opportunity wage depends on other managers’, including the CEO’s, actions and firm 
performance. This effect can motivate the key subordinate executives to be more long-term 
oriented and to exert monitoring on the CEO. 
Not only do key subordinate executives have incentives to increase long-term firm value, 
they also have the means to influence corporate decisions toward their preferences. Prior 
research argues that because key subordinate executives’ effort is an important determinant of 
current cash flows and the CEO’s welfare, the CEO will consider key subordinate executives’ 
preferences when making important corporate decisions; otherwise, subordinate executives 
might not work hard, hence reducing current and future cash flows and the CEO’s welfare (Allen 
and Gale 2000; Acharya et al. 2011).  
The above discussion implies that the effectiveness of internal governance depends on the 
decision horizon of key subordinate executives and the influence they have on the CEO. In this 
paper, we use the number of years until retirement age (assumed to be 65) to capture these 
executives’ decision horizon and we use the level of their compensation relative to the CEO’s to 
capture their influence. We expect that the longer the horizon and the higher the relative 
compensation, the more effective is internal governance, and the lower the extent of real earnings 
management. Of course, subordinate executives might have the same incentives as the CEO to 
increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term value. Or, subordinate executives 
might be afraid of the consequences of disobeying the CEO (e.g., being demoted or fired) and 
hence do not exert monitoring on the CEO.4 In addition, it is possible that the key subordinate 
                                                            
4 See Feng et al. (2011) for evidence on the role of powerful CEOs in influencing CFOs to undertake material 
accounting manipulations. 
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executives are in a tournament or competition for the CEO’s job with external candidates; as a 
result, they could undertake real earnings management to increase short-term earnings and/or to 
curry favor with the CEO who likely plays an important role in selecting his/her successor. These 
possibilities introduce tension to our research question and thus whether internal governance can 
effectively reduce the extent of real earnings management is an empirical question.  
We test our hypothesis using 11,994 firm-year observations from the S&P 1500 firms in 
the period 1993-2011. The empirical results are consistent with our prediction. We find that the 
extent of real earnings management decreases with subordinate executives’ horizon and relative 
compensation. The results hold after we control for CEO and firm characteristics that might 
affect the extent of real earnings management (e.g., CEO horizon, CEO compensation structure, 
firm age, analyst coverage, firm size, firm performance, leverage, firm growth opportunities, and 
other governance mechanisms). When we split the sample firms into suspect firms – the 
subsample of firms that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts – and other firms, we find that the 
results only hold for the suspect firms, where CEOs have incentives to engage in upward real 
earnings management. We do not find results for the other firms. The remaining analyses are 
thus based on the sample of suspect firms. 
In the main analyses, we use the relative compensation of the key subordinate executives to 
capture their ability to influence the CEO on key corporate decisions. An alternative 
interpretation of our results is that this proxy captures CEO entrenchment, not internal 
governance per se, and entrenched CEOs engage in more real earnings management. In an 
additional analysis, we use two alternative measures to investigate the robustness of our results 
and to address this alternative explanation. More specifically, we use the abnormal compensation 
of subordinate executives and whether the subordinate executives sit on other companies’ boards 
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as alternative proxies for their influence. Our inferences based on these two alternative proxies 
remain the same. 
As with many corporate governance studies, we recognize that our analyses might be 
subject to endogeneity concerns because firms’ internal governance is arguably endogenously 
determined. The factors that affect the strength of internal governance might also affect the 
extent of real earnings management. We address this endogeneity concern using a number of 
approaches. First, we use the lagged values of internal governance in all our analyses and include 
a comprehensive list of control variables that are likely correlated with both internal governance 
and the extent of real earnings management. Second, we use an instrumental variable approach to 
further control for potential endogeneity concerns. Specifically, following related prior studies 
(e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja 2007; Kale, Reis, and 
Venkateswaran 2009; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011), we use the two-year lagged value of 
internal governance, the industry-year median of internal governance, the number of named 
executives in the proxy statement, and an indicator for outside CEOs as instruments. Our 
inferences remain the same. Third, we adopt a difference-in-differences design by examining the 
impact on the extent of real earnings management of the appointment of a subordinate executive 
as an independent director of another company (one of our alternative proxies for internal 
governance). We find that before such appointments, firms that later on have subordinate 
executives serving as independent directors of other companies do not differ in the extent of real 
earnings management from the firms without such subordinate executives. However, after such 
appointments, firms with subordinate executives serving as independent directors experience a 
significant decrease in the extent of real earnings management compared to other firms. These 
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tests indicate that our results are not driven by the potential endogeneity concern.5 
To corroborate the inference from the main analyses, we conduct a series of cross-sectional 
analyses. First, key subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO’s decision hinges on 
their contribution to firm performance and we argue that their contribution is greater when the 
firm’s operations are more complex. Accordingly, we expect that the impact of internal 
governance is higher when operation complexity is higher. We use industry R&D intensity and a 
common factor based on the number of geographical segments, geographical sales concentration, 
and foreign sales to capture the complexity of a firm’s operations. The results are consistent with 
our prediction that the impact of internal governance is stronger when operation complexity is 
higher. Second, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger when the CEO is more 
effectively monitored and less powerful, proxied for by higher board independence, higher 
institutional ownership, and an indicator for newly appointed outside CEOs. This result also 
indicates that other governance mechanisms can enhance subordinate executives’ ability to 
influence the CEO’s decisions. Third, we find that the effect of internal governance is attenuated 
for firms in financial distress, for firms that routinely meet or beat earnings targets, and for firms 
with upcoming financing activities, presumably because subordinate executives have weaker 
incentives to constrain real earnings management when the capital markets benefit of meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks is higher. 
We also conduct a series of additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results and to 
provide additional insights. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act exerts a shock to firms’ 
governance (e.g., requiring higher board independence) and the extent of real earnings 
management (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008). As such, we expect internal governance to be more 
                                                            
5 Our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate the endogeneity concern because it is arguably harder for an omitted 
variable to explain both our main and cross-sectional findings. 
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effective in constraining the extent of real earnings management in the post-SOX period. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that our results are stronger in the post-SOX period than 
in the pre-SOX period.  
Second, we find that internal governance is more effective in constraining real earnings 
management for firms in more homogeneous and competitive industries, where CEOs 
presumably have greater career concerns and thus have stronger incentives to manage earnings to 
report better financial performance (Parrino 1997; DeFond and Park 1999). Lastly, we find that 
internal governance is less effective in constraining real earnings management for firms with 
large forthcoming fixed-date option grants, where CEOs presumably have incentives to engage 
in downward earnings management in order to reduce the exercise price of option grants (e.g., 
McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver 2008).  
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, this paper is the first to 
examine the association between internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management. This examination is important as it sheds light on how the members of the 
management team work together and shape financial reporting. This paper differs from and 
complements studies on the impact of CFOs’ characteristics on accrual quality or the likelihood 
of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all key subordinate executives and by focusing on 
real earnings management.  
Second, our examination of internal governance helps provide a more complete picture of 
how firms work. Unlike prior research which generally views top executives as a unified team, 
this paper provides evidence that key subordinate executives can serve an important monitoring 
role and that effective internal governance can reduce the extent of CEOs’ myopic behavior. Our 
study answers Fama’s (1980, 293) call for research on internal governance. He argues that while 
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each manager is concerned with the performance of others in the firm and as a consequence, 
undertakes certain monitoring of other managers, both above or below, “less well appreciated, 
however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top.”  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary of prior 
research and develops hypotheses. Section III describes the sample and data and presents the 
research design. Section IV reports the main analysis of the impact of internal governance on the 
extent of real earnings management, the analysis based on alternative proxies for internal 
governance, and analyses addressing the potential endogeneity concerns. Section V reports the 
cross-sectional analyses and Section VI additional analyses. Section VII concludes.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
We rely and build on two steams of the earnings management literature: the impact of 
individual executives on financial reporting quality and real earnings management.  
One of the fundamental drivers of earnings management is the pressure on managers to 
deliver short-term performance that is used in contracting and firm valuation. See, for examples, 
DeFond and Park (1997) on the pressure related to job security, Matsunaga and Park (2001) on 
the pressure related to meeting earnings benchmarks, and Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002) and 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) on the capital market pressure to deliver short-term performance. 
A recent survey study, Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013), concludes that “about 20 
percent of firms manage earnings to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 10 
percent of EPS is typically managed.” Using a different research methodology, Dyck, Morse, 
and Zingales (2013) also conclude that earnings management and accounting frauds are 
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prevalent. Given the vast literature on earnings management, we do not provide a detailed 
literature review here and we refer readers to the review papers that discuss in greater detail the 
demand for earnings management and how managers benefit from this activity (e.g., Schipper 
1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001; 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010).6  
Most prior studies tend to focus on the management team as a whole or solely on the CEO 
as the person(s) held primarily responsible for earnings management within the firm. Recently, 
the literature starts to examine the effect of CFOs on earnings quality. For example, Geiger and 
North (2006) find that the appointment of new CFOs is associated with a decrease in 
discretionary accruals and that the result is largely driven by new CFOs who are hired from 
outside. Focusing on CFO directors, Bedard, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2014) find that firms with 
CFOs who sit on their own board exhibit higher reporting quality (e.g., lower likelihood of 
internal control weaknesses, lower likelihood of restatements, and higher accruals quality). Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) find that CFOs matter for various accounting choices, such as 
discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or just beating earnings expectations, and the 
likelihood of restatements.7 
There are also studies contrasting the impact of CFOs’ incentives with that of CEOs’ on 
earnings management. Jiang et al. (2010) find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood 
of meeting or just beating analysts’ forecast are more sensitive to CFOs’ than to CEOs’ equity 
incentives in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, Feng et al. (2011) find that while CEOs of firms 
                                                            
6 While the literature focusses primarily on accrual-based earnings management, the argument on the demand for 
and the benefit (to managers) of earnings management apply to real earnings management as well. Indeed, the recent 
development of the real earnings management literature builds on prior studies of accrual-based earnings 
management. 
7 Ge et al. (2011) capture the effect of CFO style by using a fixed effect model to track CFOs who work in multiple 
companies over their sample period. 
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that are involved in material accounting manipulations (manipulations that violate GAAP) have 
higher equity incentives than their counterparts in other firms, CFOs of these accounting 
manipulation firms have similar levels of equity incentives as their counterparts in other firms. 
Despite their lack of incentives, CFOs who are involved in material accounting manipulations 
suffer substantial losses. Feng et al. conclude that the direct financial gain is not the main 
motivation for CFOs to be involved in earnings manipulation. Rather, CFOs likely succumb to 
powerful CEOs’ pressure to manipulate financial statements. 
We extend this line of research by focusing on a broader set of key subordinate executives, 
including not only CFOs but also other top executives, and examine their impact on the extent of 
real earnings management. We focus on real earnings management for two reasons.8 First, the 
tradeoff between increasing short-term performance and increasing long-term firm value is 
important for real earnings management. For example, cutting R&D expenditures now to meet 
current year’s earnings targets will lead to lower long-term investment and likely reduce the 
company’s ability to compete in the product markets and to generate profits in the future. 
Consistent with this notion, Bhojraj et al. (2009), Leggett, Parsons, and Reitenga (2009), and 
Mizik (2010) report that firms that reduce discretionary spending to beat earnings benchmark 
exhibit long-term underperformance. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Mizik and Jacobson (2008) 
document that firms engaging in real earnings management prior to seasoned equity offerings 
have poorer operating performance in the future. Graham et al. (2005) also provide supporting 
                                                            
8 In an untabulated analysis, we examine the impact of internal governance on accrual earnings management. Ex-
ante, whether non-CFO subordinate executives can influence the extent of accrual earnings management is unclear. 
On one hand, key subordinate executives do not play a direct role in accrual management because unlike the CFO, 
they are not directly involved in the financial reporting process. On the other hand, they likely have an important 
influence over the corporate culture and the overall corporate attitude toward earnings management. If the key 
subordinate executives focus on the long-term value of the firm, their preference might manifest in less accrual-
based earnings management. After considering the interrelationship between real and accrual earnings management, 
we do not find robust evidence that subordinate executives have a significant impact on the extent of accrual 
earnings management, consistent with these executives playing a more limited role in the financial reporting 
process. 
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evidence based on their surveys of CFOs.9 Second and importantly, key subordinate executives 
have more direct control and influence over real activities, such as R&D expenditures, 
production volumes, and sales decisions, than over accrual-based earnings management.  
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that explicitly examines the impact of subordinate 
executives on the extent of real earnings management. The extant literature on real earnings 
management has focused primarily on documenting the existence of real earnings management. 
For example, Graham et al. (2005) report that 80 percent of surveyed CFOs stated that, in order 
to deliver earnings, they would decrease research and development (R&D), advertising, and 
maintenance expenditures, while 55 percent said they would postpone a new project, both of 
which are real activities manipulation. Roychowdhury (2006) documents the existence of real 
earnings management in firms that meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. Cohen et al. (2008) 
find that the extent of real earnings management is higher in the post-SOX period than in the pre-
SOX period. We extend this line of research by examining how internal governance affects the 
extent of real earnings management, complementing studies that examine the impact on real 
earnings management of other governance mechanisms, such as institutional ownership, board 
independence, and employment agreement (e.g., Bushee 1998; Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, 
and Neal 2006; Zhao 2011; Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang 2015).  
Hypothesis Development 
Main Hypothesis  
In this section, we discuss why key subordinate executives have both the incentive and 
                                                            
9 In contrast, Gunny (2010) finds that firms engaging in real earnings management to report small positive earnings 
exhibit better subsequent performance and she attributes this result to the signaling role of real earnings 
management. In light of this contradictory evidence, in an untabulated analysis we examine the association between 
our real earnings management proxies and future performance in our sample. Unlike Gunny (2010), we find that our 
measures of real earnings management are associated with significantly lower one-year-ahead returns on assets and 
cash flow from operations.  
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ability to provide monitoring and reduce the extent of real earnings management.  
As discussed above, one of the fundamental drivers of earnings management is the pressure 
on CEOs to deliver short-term performance. While it is possible that key subordinate executives 
are under similar or even greater pressure to deliver short-term performance, yet as compared to 
CEOs, key subordinate executives have longer horizons that induce them to care more about 
long-term firm value for three reasons. First, one of the career objectives of many key 
subordinate executives is to become the next CEO when the current CEO retires or resigns. As 
documented in Cremers and Grinstein (2011), 68.6 percent of CEOs are promoted within the 
firm; in other words, in 68.6 percent of the CEO turnover cases, one of the key subordinate 
executives becomes the next CEO.10 As the potential CEO in the future, these subordinate 
executives care about the cash flows that the firm can generate in the future. Since a company’s 
performance depends critically on the capital stock (i.e., value enhancing assets), how the 
company performs when the subordinate manager becomes the CEO depends on current 
investment. Thus, subordinate executives are hypothesized to care more about long-term 
investment and therefore less likely to support activities that sacrifice long-term positive NPV 
investments to meet short-term earnings targets.  
Second, subordinate executives have more to lose in the event of corporate 
underperformance and operational failures. Key subordinate executives are usually younger than 
the CEO. In our sample, they are three years younger at the sample median, and this difference 
represents a 30 percent increase in the number of years of remaining employment (i.e., the 
number of years until the assumed retirement age of 65). Their future compensation likely 
                                                            
10 Based on data from ExecuComp, we find that 59.7 percent of the CEOs in our sample were promoted within the 
company. Within this group of CEOs, 36.0 percent were the Chief Operating Officer, 40.8 percent were the 
President, and 7.5 percent were the Vice President. These statistics confirm that inside-CEOs are generally selected 
from the set of key subordinate executives we study. 
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represents a larger proportion of their overall income and wealth. While the CEO might also 
suffer from poor firm performance, the concept of diminishing marginal utility suggests that the 
relative impact, i.e., the impact of the potential loss related to the individual’s total wealth, is 
important. As such, lower compensation due to poor firm performance in the future or loss of 
income due to the difficulty of finding a comparable job is higher for younger executives and 
increases with their horizon. This is the same idea underlying the horizon problem discussed in 
Dechow and Sloan (1991).  
Third, Fama (1980) argues that in general, a manager’s outside opportunity wage depends 
on other managers’, including the CEO’s, actions and firm performance. This effect can motivate 
the key subordinate executives to be more long-term oriented and to exert monitoring on the 
CEO.  
The above discussion implies that subordinate executives have longer horizons than the 
CEO. The longer the subordinate executives’ horizon, the stronger their incentives not to 
sacrifice long-term value for short-term goals.  
Not only do subordinate executives have incentives, they also have the means to influence 
the CEO’s decision. The current CEO’s welfare depends on the cash flow in the current period, 
which is affected by the key subordinate executives’ effort levels.11 If the CEO does not consider 
the subordinate executives’ interests, subordinate executives can work less diligently, hence 
reducing the current cash flow and the CEO’s welfare (Allen and Gale 2000; Acharya et al. 
2011).12 Anticipating this, it is in the best interest of the CEO to consider subordinate executives’ 
                                                            
11 The importance of these key subordinate executives is self-evident. In a recent study, Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
(2013) find that only about 15 percent of the surveyed CEOs and CFOs indicate that the CEO is the sole-decision 
maker in their firms regarding important corporate decisions, such as M&A, capital allocation and investments. 
12 This argument is plausible because an individual’s effort level is usually unobservable and subordinate executives 
have the best information to decide the appropriate effort level. (This is the same reason why top executives are 
given performance-based bonus and stock-based compensation, not just a fixed salary). 
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interests, motivating subordinate executives to work harder (Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 2009). 
Applying the above general discussion to the real earnings management setting, if the CEO 
chooses real activity manipulation that decreases long-term firm value, key subordinate 
executives will choose a lower effort level. Anticipating this, the CEO will be less likely to 
engage in real earnings management. In other words, if the CEO does not engage in real earnings 
management, then the subordinate executives’ interest is aligned and they will work harder to 
improve both current and future firm performance.  
In addition, the CEO needs the subordinate executives’ cooperation to engage in real 
earnings management because subordinate executives are usually more informed than the CEO 
in their own functional areas. For example, the president in charge of production likely has more 
information about the supply of raw materials and the demand from customers. Hence, he or she 
will play an important role if the firm decides to overproduce in order to increase the current 
period’s earnings. Similarly, the executive in charge of R&D is better informed and can 
influence whether and how much the firm can reduce the current period’s R&D. That is, while 
the CEO has the formal authority to make the decision, subordinate executives have the real 
authority, e.g., effective control over the decisions, due to their information advantage (Aghion 
and Tirole 1997). As such, the CEO will have to take the subordinate executives’ preferences 
into consideration. 
Overall, the effectiveness of key subordinate executives’ influence in curbing myopic 
behavior depends on their horizon and their ability to influence CEOs’ decisions. The longer the 
horizon and the more influence the key subordinate executives have, the more effective the 
internal governance, and the less likely that the company will engage in real earnings 
management. Thus, our first hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:  
15 
 
H1: The extent of upward real earnings management is negatively associated with the 
effectiveness of internal governance.  
 
As discussed below, we use key subordinate executives’ horizon (i.e., the number of years until 
retirement) and their relative pay (i.e., the average pay of subordinate executives divided by CEO 
pay) to capture the effectiveness of internal governance.  
There are two critical assumptions underlying H1. First, we rely on prior research to argue 
that the CEO has incentives to increase short-term performance at the expense of long-term 
value, such as to increase job security (DeFond and Park 1997) and to increase compensation 
(e.g., Healy 1985; Cheng and Warfield 2005). One might argue that subordinate executives 
might be as myopic as the CEO. In addition, it is possible that the key subordinate executives are 
in a tournament or competition for the CEO’s position with external candidates. As a result, they 
might undertake real earnings management to increase short-term earnings and/or to curry favor 
with the CEO who likely plays a role in selecting his/her successor. If this is the case, we will not 
find results consistent with H1. Second, while prior research indicates that key subordinate 
executives have the ability to influence CEOs’ decisions, CEOs have the power to demote or fire 
these subordinate executives. Job security concerns can motivate subordinates to cooperate with 
CEOs in carrying out myopic behavior (Feng et al. 2011). Of course, firing key subordinate 
executives because they do not cooperate in myopic behavior can backfire. Having nothing to 
lose after being fired, subordinate executives can become “whistle-blowers” and reveal the 
inappropriate behavior to the board, investors, and the press, or seek legal action against the firm 
for inappropriate dismissal. This potential outcome will deter CEOs from freely firing 
subordinate executives who choose not to engage in myopic behavior. Again, if subordinate 
executives have no influence on CEOs’ myopic behavior or if CEOs have no incentive to engage 
in earnings management, we will not find results consistent with H1. Thus, whether we find 
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results consistent with H1 is an empirical question.  
Cross-sectional Analyses 
To corroborate our theory and main hypothesis that key subordinate executives have the 
ability and incentive to influence the extent of real earnings management, we propose several 
cross-sectional predictions that exploit the variation in subordinate executives’ ability and 
incentive. These cross-sectional tests also help rule out competing explanations for the main 
result.  
Variation in subordinate executives’ contribution 
One key assumption underlying H1 is that subordinate executives can influence corporate 
decisions to reflect their preferences. Because one of the fundamental reasons why key 
subordinate executives can influence CEOs’ decisions is their contribution to firm performance, 
the greater the subordinate executives’ contribution, the greater is their potential influence on 
CEOs (Finkelstein 1992; Acharya et al. 2011). Prior research indicates that complex firms are 
more difficult to manage and requires the collective efforts of all executives (e.g., Graham et al. 
2013). We thus expect the impact of internal governance to be stronger in more complex firms 
than in other firms. Our next hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows: 
H2: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of upward real 
earnings management is stronger in more complex firms than in other firms. 
 
We discuss the proxy for firm complexity in the empirical section.  
Variation in CEO power 
Subordinate executives’ ability to influence CEOs’ decision is likely affected by how 
powerful the CEOs are. According to Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), powerful CEOs are 
those who can consistently influence key decisions in their firms, despite the potential opposition 
from other executives. In firms where CEOs are powerful, decision making authority is usually 
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centralized in the hands of the CEO and thus these CEOs are able to push their agenda even if 
the decision may be viewed as sub-optimal. Consistent with this reasoning, Feng et al. (2011) 
find that CFOs likely succumb to powerful CEOs’ pressure to manipulate financial statements. 
Therefore, we expect subordinate executives to have lower ability to influence CEOs’ decision 
when CEOs hold substantial power and authority within the firm. Conversely, we expect internal 
governance to be more effective in constraining the extent of real earnings management when 
CEOs are less powerful, and thus our third hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows:  
H3: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of upward real 
earnings management is stronger for firms with less powerful CEOs than for other 
firms. 
 
We discuss the proxy for CEOs’ power in the empirical analysis section.  
Capital markets benefits of meeting or beating earnings expectations 
In developing the main hypothesis, we argue that subordinate executives have incentives to 
reduce the extent of real earnings management because such activities can reduce firm value in 
the long run. However, if such activities can increase firm value in the short run that also benefit 
subordinate executives, they will have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings management. 
Prior research documents the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings expectations 
(e.g., Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002). If the benefit is high enough to 
outweigh the cost of real earnings management, then the effectiveness of internal governance is 
expected to be lower. Firms in financial distress, such as those with poor credit rating, benefit 
more from meeting or beating earnings benchmarks because missing earnings expectations could 
lead to credit rating downgrades, inhibiting the firm’s ability in obtaining future financing and 
thus perpetuating financial distress. Consistent with this reasoning, Jiang (2008) finds that the 
reduction in the cost of debt from beating earnings benchmark is more pronounced for firms with 
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high default risk. Firms which habitually meet or beat earnings expectations also benefit more 
from meeting earnings benchmarks because of the additional market premium from consistently 
meeting earnings targets (Kaznik and McNichols 2002). Finally, firms that have a forthcoming 
debt or equity issuance benefit more from beating earnings benchmarks, which can increase the 
proceeds from debt/equity financing. Therefore, in instances where the capital markets benefit of 
reporting higher earnings is high, we expect subordinate executives to have weaker incentives to 
constrain real earnings management, and thus our last hypothesis (in alternative form) is as 
follows: 
H4: The effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of upward real 
earnings management is weaker for firms with higher capital markets benefit of 
meeting or beating earnings expectations than for other firms. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample 
We obtain our initial sample of firms from Compustat ExecuComp in the period from 1993 
to 2011. We limit our examination to firms with compensation details of the top five executives 
and require at least five executives (including the CEO) to be reported in the annual proxy 
statement.13 To ensure that we have an appropriate measure of CEO’s influence within the firm, 
we require the CEO to be in office for the entire year. We exclude firms in financial (2-digit 
SICs between 60 and 69) and utility (2-digit SICs of 49) industries because firms in regulated 
industries have different financial reporting incentives from other firms. We then merge the 
sample of executive-level data with Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S to obtain the data for the 
other variables required for the analyses and we drop the observations that have missing values 
                                                            
13 About 9 percent of firm-year observations in ExecuComp report compensation information for fewer than five 
executives. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we exclude these observations from our sample to ensure that our 
measure of key subordinate executives’ influence is comparable across firms. 
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for these variables. Our final sample consists of 11,994 firm-years, and Panel A of Table 1 
reports the sample selection process. 
Table 1, Panel B reports the job titles of the key subordinate executives in our sample 
firms.14 In our empirical tests, key subordinate executives refer to the top four non-CEO 
executives included in the ExecuComp database.15 The CFO is usually included in the top four 
executives, with an increased frequency in recent years, possibly because of the increasing 
influence of CFOs in the post-SOX era. Other key executives reported in the proxy statements 
usually hold job titles such as Chief Operating Officer (COO), President, Executive or Senior 
Vice President, and Vice President. These titles suggest that the key subordinate executives in 
our sample usually hold very important positions and thus have significant responsibilities within 
the firm, leading to their ability to monitor the CEO and to influence real earnings management. 
Measure of Internal Governance 
In this paper, we posit that the effectiveness of internal governance increases with key 
subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor the CEO. We measure key subordinate 
executives’ monitoring incentives based on their decision horizon, which we proxy for using the 
number of years until the age of retirement (assumed to be 65):16,17  
                                                            
14 Ideally, we would like to categorize the job title of the key subordinate executives based on their job function, 
such as sales, production, and R&D. However, the job titles in ExecuComp do not indicate the job scope of the key 
executives, and many firms categorize their job titles by business segments (e.g. subsidiaries), geographical 
segments or product segments rather than by function. As such, we can only provide generic job titles. 
15 We limit our scope of subordinate executives to the top four executives other than the CEO because most firms 
only disclose the compensation details of the top five executives (including the CEO) in their proxy statements. 
16 We use the horizon of key subordinate executives, not their horizon relative to the CEO’s, because it is the 
horizon itself that leads subordinate executives to care about long-term firm value. The difference in horizon does 
not necessarily capture executives’ incentives to increase long-term firm value. For example, in firm A, subordinate 
executives are on average 50 years old and the CEO is 55 years old; in firm B, subordinate executives are on 
average 60 years old and the CEO is 65 years old. While the difference in horizon between subordinate executives 
and the CEO is the same for the two firms, firm A’s subordinate executives have longer horizon, arguably care more 
about the firm’s long-term value, than their counterparts in Company B. In the empirical analyses, we include CEO 
horizon to control for its impact on the extent of real earnings management. Nevertheless, we obtain qualitatively 
similar results when using the difference in horizon.  
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Exec_Horizon = 65 – the average age of key subordinate executives 
Next, we measure key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO based on their 
influence within the organization. We posit that competitive labor markets dictate the 
compensation of top executives and hence their compensation reflects their contribution to, and 
their influence within, the firm.18 In addition, Finkelstein (1992) argues that an executive’s 
compensation reflects her power derived from her structural position in the firm. Therefore, our 
measure of key subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO is defined as follows:19 
ܧݔ݁ܿ_ܲܽݕܴܽݐ݅݋	 ൌ Average	annual	compensation	of	key	subordinate	executivesCEO’s	annual	compensation  
We scale the average compensation of key subordinate executives by CEO’s annual 
compensation because we want to capture key subordinate executives’ influence within the firm. 
The level of key executives’ compensation varies across firms and does not capture how much 
influence the executives have within the firm. For example, subordinate executives in a large 
firm might erroneously be regarded as having more influence than their counterparts in a small 
firm if one uses the unscaled level of compensation as the proxy for their influence within the 
firm. In an additional analysis, we use the unscaled abnormal compensation of key subordinate 
executives as an alternative proxy and the inferences remain the same; see Section IV for details.  
Finally, we derive an aggregate measure of a firm’s overall internal governance 
effectiveness based on both the incentive and ability of key subordinate executives to monitor the 
CEO. Specifically, we standardize both Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio and sum the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
17 Assuming a different retirement age, such as 70, does not change the regression results (except the intercept) 
because the retirement age is assumed to be a cross-sectional constant and is thus just a scalar. 
18 Executives’ compensation is also closely related to their outside opportunity wage, which is then related to their 
influence within the firm. An executive with a higher outside opportunity wage is more likely to stand by his or her 
position and is less concerned with the CEO’s reaction (e.g., being demoted or fired).  
19 Some prior studies use variations of the inverse of this measure, or pay slice, to capture tournament incentives 
(Kale et al. 2009) or CEO entrenchment (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2011). We explore alternative proxies 
below to address the concern that our inferences are confounded by these alternative interpretations. 
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standardized measures as our proxy for the firm’s overall internal governance effectiveness 
(Int_Governance).20,21  
Measure of Real Earnings Management 
We derive our measure of real earnings management following prior studies 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In particular, we use three individual metrics, 
abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (RM_CFO), production costs (RM_PROD) and 
discretionary expenses (RM_DISX), and two aggregate metrics (RM1 and RM2) to measure the 
level of real earnings management. These individual measures are the residuals from the 
corresponding estimation model, as described in the Appendix. Executives can artificially inflate 
reported earnings by: 1) accelerating sales using aggressive price discounts and/or more lenient 
credit terms which results in abnormally low cash flow from operations (CFO); 2) reducing the 
costs of sales by increasing production so as to spread the fixed costs of production over a larger 
number of units, thereby resulting in abnormally high production cost (PROD); 3) reducing the 
amount of discretionary research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses which result in abnormally low discretionary expenses (DISX). 
Therefore, higher abnormal PROD, lower abnormal CFO, and lower abnormal DISX are 
consistent with income-increasing real earnings management. For ease of interpretation, all 
measures (RM_CFO, RM_PROD, and RM_DISX) are defined to be increasing in reported 
                                                            
20 Specifically, for each of the two variables, we deduct the sample mean and then divide the difference by the 
sample standard deviation of the variable. We also explore an alternative aggregate measure based on a non-linear 
combination of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio and obtain quantitatively similar results (untabulated). In 
particular, we form tercile ranks on Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio, sum the tercile rank of both variables, and 
then rescale the aggregate measure to lie within zero and one. 
21 Note that Int_Governance is not a common factor of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio; we are not assuming that 
these two variables are highly correlated and capture the common underlying construct. Instead, we argue that these 
two variables capture different dimensions of internal governance; executives with long horizon and high pay 
relative to the CEO (a high value of Int_Governance) have both the incentive and the ability to monitor CEOs 
compared to their counterparts with short horizon and low pay relative to the CEO (a low value of Int_Governance). 
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earnings.22 
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we define two aggregate measures of real earnings 
management, RM1 and RM2, to capture the total amount of real earnings management engaged 
by the firm in a particular fiscal year:23 
RM1 = RM_DISX +RM_ PROD 
RM2 = RM_CFO + RM_DISX 
Empirical Model 
Below we describe the research design for the main test of H1. The design for other tests is 
described in the corresponding empirical analysis sections. To test H1, we estimate the following 
regression: 
ti,
ti,1-ti,1-ti,ti,
 + Year_FE +  EIndustry_F +
 olsFirm_Contr + lsCEO_Contro + anceInt_Govern +  =RM

 ψγ
, (1) 
where RMi,t is the measure of real earnings management and Int_Governancei,t-1 is the measure 
of a firm’s internal governance strength, as discussed above. Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative 
coefficient on Int_Governance. CEO_Controlsi,t-1 are the CEO characteristics that are included to 
control for the CEO’s incentives and power in the prior fiscal year; Firm_Controlsi,t are 
contemporaneous firm-level control variables; Industry_FE and Year_FE are industry and year 
                                                            
22 Prior research on accruals-based earnings management suggests that discretionary accrual models might be mis-
specified when applied to firms with extreme financial performance (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). A similar concern may apply to the real earnings management measures. In an 
untabulated analysis, we use a similar research design as proposed in Kothari et al. (2005) and estimate 
performance-matched real earnings management proxies. We use two alternative performance measures, earnings 
(ROA) and operating cash flow (CFO), because unlike accrual earnings management, real earnings management 
affects both earnings and cash flow. Our inferences remain the same. We do not use this approach in the main 
analyses because of smaller sample size due to the requirement of matching firms in the same industry-year with 
ROA/CFO within a narrow bandwidth. Cohen, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach. (2011) also note that performance-
matched real earnings management measures can provide conservative tests that under-reject the null hypotheses 
relating to income-increasing real earnings management, which is our economic phenomenon of interest. 
23 We do not use an aggregate measure based on all three real earnings management proxies because, as suggested in 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), some activities that lead to abnormally high production costs 
might also lead to abnormally low CFO. Therefore, combining these two measures can result in double counting. In 
addition, we note that the three individual measures capture different types of real earnings management. As a result, 
we do not use a common factor based on these three measures in the analyses.  
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fixed-effects, respectively.24 We use the lagged value of all variables relating to internal 
governance and CEO’s characteristics to alleviate the potential endogeneity concern. We also 
utilize an instrumental variable approach and a difference-in-differences analysis to further 
mitigate this concern, as discussed in Section IV. Appendix A includes the detailed definition of 
all variables. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, all continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Because we use a pooled sample, we use firm and year 
clustered standard errors to control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the data 
(Petersen 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010).  
We include CEO control variables to mitigate the concern that our proxies for key 
subordinate executives’ incentives and ability to monitor the CEO merely capture the effect of 
CEO’s incentives and power on real earnings management. Specifically, we include the CEO’s 
decision horizon (CEO_Horizon), proxied for by the number of years until the age of retirement 
(assumed to be 65), the CEO’s annual compensation (CEO_Comp), and CEO’s pay-for-
performance sensitivity (CEO_PPS), measured as the sensitivity of the CEO’s equity portfolio to 
the firm’s stock performance (Core and Guay 2002). 
Following prior studies, we include several firm-level control variables to capture the 
impact of firm characteristics on the extent of real earnings management. The inclusion of these 
variables can also help alleviate the omitted correlated variable concern arising from potential 
endogeneity of internal governance. Firm age (Firm_Age) is included because younger firms, 
which are usually high-growth firms and are expected to obtain additional financing in the 
future, likely face greater capital markets pressure to deliver and hence are more likely to engage 
in real earnings management to meet earnings targets (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Erickson, 
                                                            
24 Because of the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects, the intercept (α) captures the extent of real earnings 
management for firms in the industry and year that do not have corresponding indicators in the regression and when 
all independent variables have values of zero. As such, we do not present the estimates of the intercept in the tables. 
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Hanlon, and Maydew 2006; Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2013). We include the 
number of analysts following (N_Analyst) because the monitoring by financial analysts is likely 
to constrain real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Lastly, firm performance 
(ROA), firm size (Size), the book-to-market ratio (B/M), and leverage (Leverage) are included as 
controls for other firm-specific characteristics such as capital structure and growth opportunities 
that likely affect real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010).25  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel C reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. Because the 
model for real earnings management is estimated using the ExecuComp universe and our sample 
is similarly obtained from ExecuComp, the means and medians of the individual real earning 
management proxies are close to zero. The mean (median) decision horizon of key subordinate 
executives (Exec_Horizon) is 12.70 (13.00) years, which is longer than that of the CEO’s mean 
(median) decision horizon (CEO_Horizon) of 9.50 (10.00) years by 33.7 percent (30.0 percent). 
This comparison supports the notion that key subordinate executives have longer decision 
horizons than the CEO. The mean (median) annual compensation of the key subordinate 
executive relative to that of the CEO is 0.558 (0.436). By construction, the summary measure of 
internal governance, Int_Governance, has a mean of zero. As our sample firms are from 
ExecuComp which only includes firms from the S&P1500, our sample firms are significantly 
more mature (mean Firm_Age of 22.9 years), have more analysts following (mean N_Analyst of 
                                                            
25 We also control for other variables that might affect the extent of real earnings management, such as the G-index, 
an indicator for CEO-Chairman duality, the pay-for-performance sensitivity of key subordinate executives, and the 
squared term of internal governance measures. Similarly, we control for several variables that have been used to 
proxy for the cost of real earnings management: market share, Z-score, institutional ownership, and marginal tax rate 
(Zang 2012). The untabulated analyses indicate that the results on the variables of interest are qualitatively similar. 
The G-index and the CEO-Chairman duality exhibit marginally significant coefficients in some specifications, 
consistent with the extent of real earnings management being higher when there are more anti-takeover measures 
and when the CEO is more likely to be entrenched. The other aforementioned variables are insignificant in most 
specifications. We omit these controls in our main analyses in favor of a more parsimonious empirical model and a 
larger and more generalizable sample.  
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11.1 analysts), have better performance (mean ROA of 5.5%), and are larger (mean Size, ln(Total 
assets), of 7.3), as compared to the firms covered in the Compustat universe in the same time 
period.26 The average book-to-market ratio is 0.505 and the average leverage is 0.512.  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation table of the variables in our main analysis. The 
three measures of real earnings management (RM_CFO, RM_PROD, and RM_DISX) are highly 
positively correlated with each other except for the correlation between RM_CFO and 
RM_DISX. These high correlations suggest that firms manage one real activity in tandem with 
other real activities. By construction, RM1 and RM2 are highly correlated with individual 
components and with each other. The correlation between Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio is 
positive, but the relatively low correlation coefficient (0.08) suggests that key subordinate 
executives’ decision horizon and influence capture different aspects of firms’ internal 
governance. Consistent with H1, almost all real earnings management measures are negatively 
associated with the proxies of internal governance. None of the correlations between control 
variables are high enough to impose a multicollinearity problem.27 
 
IV. MAIN ANALYSES – TESTS OF H1 
Full sample analysis 
In this section, we report our main tests of H1. We first analyze the separate impact of 
                                                            
26 The average firm in the Compustat universe in the same period is 13.1 years old, is followed by 4.4 analysts, has 
ROA of -0.8% and Size of 5.8.  
27 While internal governance is negatively associated with firm performance and size, we do not believe that 
performance and size drive the documented results. First, we control for both firm performance and size in the 
multiple regression analyses. Second, as mentioned above, the inferences remain the same when we use 
performance-matched real earnings management measures. Third, we separately examine the association between 
internal governance and both firm performance and size in the suspect firms and non-suspect firms subsample 
(samples defined below). We find that internal governance is negatively associated with firm performance and size 
for both subsamples. Given that we do not find consistent results in the hypothesized direction in the non-suspect 
sample, as discussed in Section IV, the negative association between internal governance and both firm performance 
and size is unlikely to drive the results in suspect firms. 
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executive horizon and pay ratio on the extent of real earnings management, and then the impact 
of the combined internal governance measure. Table 3 presents the results. For ease of 
exposition, all measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100. 
Table 3, Panel A presents the separate impact of subordinate executives’ decision horizon 
and pay ratio on real earnings management. We find that as predicted in H1, both executives’ 
decision horizon and influence are significantly negatively associated with the extent of real 
earnings management, whether proxied for by the three individual measures (with the exception 
of the association between Exec_Horizon and RM_CFO) or by the two summary measures.28  
The results on control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. We find some 
evidence that firms with CEOs that have longer horizon are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management. CEOs with higher compensation (which also signifies their ability in the 
competitive labor market) are less likely to engage in real earnings management, suggesting that 
better-ability CEOs are associated with better earnings quality (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 
2013). We also find that firms with more analysts following and better performance are less 
likely to engage in real earnings management and that larger firms and firms with higher book-
to-market and leverage are more likely to engage in real earnings management. Finally, there is 
also evidence that younger firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management.  
Table 3, Panel B reports the analysis of the impact of the overall internal governance on 
real earnings management. Consistent with the results reported above, the overall internal 
governance (Int_Governance) is significantly associated with a lower extent of real earnings 
                                                            
28 In an untabulated analysis, we explore the potential non-linearity in the impact of executives’ decision horizon on 
real earnings management by constructing three piece-wise linear terms in Exec_horizon, following the approach 
used in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999). We find that when subordinate executives’ horizon is short – less 
than 5 years, there is no impact on the extent of real earnings management. The impact occurs when executive 
horizon is between 5 and 15 years and executive horizon beyond 15 years has no incremental effect. This result 
indicates that executives’ incentive to monitor the CEO is low when their horizon is too short (less than 5 years) and 
does not increase further after 15 years. 
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management. The effect of internal governance on real earnings management is also 
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in Int_Governance is associated with 
a decrease in RM1 and RM2 of 3.0 percent and 1.7 percent of total assets, respectively.29  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of the results and we do 
not tabulate the results to save space. First, we examine whether our results are driven by CFOs’ 
characteristics. For this purpose, we exclude CFOs from our measurement of internal 
governance. The untabulated results are quantitatively similar, suggesting that other key 
subordinate executives do influence real earnings management. Second, in the main analyses, we 
use the average of executive horizon and pay ratio to construct internal governance measures. 
We find similar results (1) when we use the median of key executives’ decision horizon and pay 
ratio in order to mitigate the concern that our results are driven by extreme values in the internal 
governance variables, and (2) when we use the maximum value of key executives’ decision 
horizon and pay ratio (internal governance can arguably be exerted by the executive who has the 
greatest incentive and ability to monitor the CEO).  
Overall, the results reported above are consistent with H1 which predicts that the extent of 
real earnings management is negatively associated with the effectiveness of internal governance.  
Suspect firms versus non-suspect firms 
One drawback of using the full sample to test H1 is that CEOs’ incentives to engage in 
earnings management are not salient. To increase our ability to detect real earnings management, 
we focus on firm-years where there is a greater likelihood of earnings management – when firms 
meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, 
                                                            
29 The impact on RM1 expressed as a percentage of total assets is computed as -2.021 (the coefficient on 
Int_Governance) × 1.468 (the sample standard deviation of Int_Governance). Note that all measures of real earnings 
management are already multiplied by 100 and hence presented as a percentage of total assets. The impact on RM2 
is computed analogously. 
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Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999). For this purpose, we follow prior research (e.g., Roychowdhury 
2006) and limit our sample to firm-years with earnings surprise between zero and one percent of 
share price, where earnings surprise is calculated as actual earnings minus the most recent 
consensus analyst forecast before the earnings announcement. We then test H1 using this sample 
of “suspect-firms.”  
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results. We find that internal governance is negatively 
correlated with both summary measures of real earnings management (t-statistic = -3.83 and -
4.37 for RM1 and RM2, respectively). The inferences are the same when we examine individual 
real earnings management measures or individual internal governance measures. We do not 
tabulate the results to preserve space. 
While Panel A presents the negative effect of internal governance on real earnings 
management, one might wonder whether suspect firms with ineffective internal governance 
indeed manage earnings upward. For this purpose, we split the suspect sample into five groups 
based on the quintile of internal governance. We find that for the subsample with internal 
governance in the bottom quintile, the average RM1 (RM2) is 0.017 (0.007), significantly 
different from zero at the 0.01 (0.08) level (untabulated). This test indicates that suspect firms 
with less effective internal governance indeed engage in upward real earnings management.   
The arguments underlying H1 imply that we will not find a negative association between 
internal governance and the extent of real earnings management in a sample where CEOs have 
low incentives to engage in upward earnings management. Therefore, as a falsification test, we 
re-run our main analyses on a sample where we do not expect earnings management and hence 
internal governance is less likely to matter. Specifically, we construct a sample of firm-years 
with earnings surprises less than -0.5 percent of stock price (big miss) and larger than 1 percent 
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of stock price (big beat). We exclude the sample of firm-years with earnings surprises between -
0.5 percent and 0 percent of stock price for two reasons. First, given the potential stock price 
penalty associated with missing analyst forecast, it is possible that managers engaged in upward 
earnings management but still failed to meet the benchmark. Second, managers near the 
important earnings benchmark may still manage earnings upwards to meet other internal and 
unobservable targets (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). Panel B of Table 4 reports the results 
using this sample of “non-suspect” firms. We do not find a significant coefficient on the internal 
governance variable (t-statistic = -1.26 and -0.81 for RM1 and RM2, respectively). This result 
reinforces our inference that internal governance plays a more important role in constraining real 
earnings management when the incentives to meet or beat earnings target is high.  
Given that we find the predicted results only for the suspect firms, we focus on this sub-
sample in the remaining analyses.  
Alternative Measures of Key Subordinate Executives’ Influence 
In our earlier analyses, we use the subordinate executives’ compensation relative to the 
CEO’s as a proxy for their influence within the firm. However, this measure might also capture 
other constructs such as agency problems (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2011): a lower ratio 
of subordinate executive pay to CEO pay implies entrenched CEOs. If so, our results could be 
interpreted as less entrenched CEOs (with high executive to CEO pay ratio) engaging in less real 
earnings management. We do not think this alternative explanation is valid because our results 
are robust to controlling for corporate governance variables, as discussed above. To further 
refute this alternative interpretation, we utilize an alternative proxy for key subordinate 
executives’ influence – their abnormal compensation. To do so, we follow the compensation 
model used by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) and regress the logged total compensation of the 
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subordinate executives on economic determinants, including prior year’s logged firm sales, S&P 
500 membership dummy, prior year’s book-to-market ratio, current and prior year’s stock 
returns, current and prior year’s return on assets, and industry and year fixed effects. We use the 
residual from this regression as a proxy for subordinate executives’ abnormal compensation 
(Exec_AbComp). This variable is not based on a comparison with CEO compensation and is thus 
not subject to the alternative interpretation, and as usually interpreted in the compensation 
literature, the abnormal compensation captures the executive’s market value. Executives with 
higher abnormal compensation are more influential and thus better able to constrain the extent of 
earnings management.  
Table 5, Panel A reports the regression results based on this variable in instead of 
Exec_Payratio in Equation (1). As observed from columns (1) to (4), our results are robust to 
using this alternative proxy for subordinate executives’ influence, either as a stand-alone 
measure or in the combined internal governance measure with executive horizon.30 
In addition, throughout the paper, we use the compensation-based measure to capture key 
executives’ influence within the firm. In an additional analysis, we explore an alternative 
measure of key subordinate executives’ influence: the number of directorships in other firms 
held by these executives (Other_Director). Finkelstein (1992) argue that sitting on other firms’ 
boards reflects an executive’s power. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) also argue that these executives 
are more influential and are more likely to be the CEO in the future. Based on these findings, we 
expect that the key subordinate executives who have directorships in other firms to exert greater 
influence over the current CEO and that the more directorships they have, the stronger their 
influence. To test this prediction, we add this alternative measure of key executives’ power to 
                                                            
30 In another untabulated sensitivity test, we use firms’ total asset as the deflator when calculating executive pay 
ratio which avoids using CEO pay as the denominator of the pay ratio. Our inferences also remain the same. 
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Equation (1) and report the results in Table 5, Panel B. In our sample, 8.0 percent of firm-year 
observations have at least one key executive holding directorship(s) in other firms.31  
In columns (1) and (2), we use Other_Director in place of Exec_PayRatio as an alternative 
proxy for key subordinate executives’ influence. As predicted, we find that Other_Director is 
negatively associated with RM1 and RM2, significant at the 0.01 level in both models (t-statistic 
= -2.44 and -2.55, respectively). This result suggests that key subordinate executives with outside 
directorships exert greater influence in constraining real earnings management. In columns (3) 
and (4), we explore whether Other_Director captures a different dimension of executives’ 
influence than Exec_PayRatio by including both variables in the same regression. We find that 
both variables have significantly negative coefficients, suggesting that Other_Director represents 
a different aspect of executives’ influence within the firm.  
In sum, our results reported above are not due to the alternative explanation based on CEO 
entrenchment or agency problems, and our results hold when using alternative measures of 
subordinate executives' influence. 
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
We recognize that our analyses might be subject to endogeneity concerns because firms’ 
internal governance is arguably endogenously determined and the determinants of the internal 
governance might also affect the extent of real earnings management. For example, some of the 
firms that are conscientious about real earnings management might select young and powerful 
subordinate executives to balance the influence of the CEO and these firms might also have 
lower extent of earnings management for other reasons (such as having a strong board of 
directors). For another example, unobservable subordinate executive talent might affect both 
                                                            
31 Within the group of firms with key subordinate executives serving as directors in other firms, 66 percent (23 
percent, 11 percent) of the firms have one (two, three or more) key subordinate executive serving as directors in 
other firms. 
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measures; talented subordinate executives are likely paid more, leading to higher value of the 
measured executive pay ratio, and are given more discretion in undertaking discretionary 
investments. We do not believe that these alternative arguments can explain our results.  
First, theoretically, the potential omitted correlated variable, such as talent, likely affect 
subordinate executives and CEOs similarly. For example, under the alternative argument based 
on executive talent, if the board is willing to award more talented subordinate executives higher 
compensation and more discretion, they should be willing to do the same for the CEO. That is, 
the board will give more talented CEOs higher compensation and more discretion. This implies 
that in the absence of CEO entrenchment, firms with highly paid CEOs will be less likely to cut 
discretionary expenditures, leading to lower executive pay ratio and lower extent of real earnings 
management, i.e., a positive association between the two. This prediction is opposite to what H1 
predicts and what we find above. Second, as highlighted earlier, we mitigate this concern by 
using the lagged values of internal governance and include a comprehensive list of control 
variables that are likely correlated with both internal governance and the extent of real earnings 
management in the main analyses or robustness checks, including corporate governance 
variables. Third, some of our cross-sectional analyses also mitigate this concern because it is 
arguably harder for an omitted correlated variable to explain both our main and cross-sectional 
findings.32 Lastly, as discussed above, we do not find consistent results for non-suspect firms. If 
omitted correlated variables drive the results, we should expect to find similar results in non-
suspect firms as well.  
Nevertheless, in this section we use two approaches, an instrumental variable approach and 
                                                            
32 For example, it is difficult to argue why executive talent plays a less important role for firms that are expected to 
benefit more from meeting or just beating earnings targets (see the development of H4 in Section II). There is no 
compelling reason to believe that the capital market benefit of meeting or just beating earnings targets to the firm 
should vary with the talent of the subordinate executives. 
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a difference-in-differences analysis, to further address the endogeneity concerns. 
An Instrumental Variable Approach  
In this section, we employ a two-stage least square instrumental variable approach to 
further address endogeneity concerns, as commonly used in the literature. In the first stage 
regression, we regress internal governance on the instrument variables and in the second stage, 
we use the predicted internal governance to explain the extent of real earnings management. For 
this purpose, we utilize four instruments: 1) the one-year lagged value of internal governance 
(Lagged_Int_Governance);33 2) the industry-year median value of internal governance (Ind-
Year-Median_Int_Governance); 3) an indicator variable, Outside_CEO, that equals one if the 
current CEO is recruited from outside, and zero otherwise; and 4) the number of named 
executives in the annual proxy statement besides the CEO (Named_Exec). For the first two 
instruments, we follow prior studies (e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Boone et al. 2007; Kale et al. 2009) 
and use the lagged endogenous variable and the industry-year median endogenous variable as 
instruments, based on the reasoning that firm-specific governance practice that persists over time 
is more likely to be exogenous to the current year’s decision (e.g., the extent of real earnings 
management engaged to meet the current year’s short-term earnings targets) and that industry-
specific governance characteristic are more likely exogenous because they are not under the 
firm’s control in any particular year. The choice of the latter two instruments is based on related 
prior studies that utilize similar instruments (e.g., Kale et al. 2009; Bebchuk et al. 2011). Based 
on these studies, we argue that when the CEO is recruited from outside, the CEO is less likely to 
possess as much firm-specific knowledge as an inside-CEO and the influence of other executives 
is likely higher, improving the effectiveness of internal governance. In a similar vein, having a 
                                                            
33 Recall that our measures of internal governance are lagged one year in all our empirical specifications. Therefore, 
this instrument is lagged two years relative to our outcome variable.  
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higher number of named executives in the annual proxy statement implies a greater number of 
highly-paid executives and a stronger presence of divisional managers who can arguably increase 
the effectiveness of internal governance. However, we are not aware of any prior research 
suggesting that having an outside CEO or the number of divisional managers is associated with 
the extent of real earnings management. As discussed below, we conduct the tests suggested by 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and find that these four instruments are relevant and valid.  
We report the first stage regression results in Column (1) of Table 6, where we regress 
Int_Governance on all four instruments as well as the controls used in the second stage 
regression. As predicted, we find that the instrument variables are significantly positively 
associated with Int_Governance with the exception of Named_Exec (t-statistic = 27.46, 9.70, 
2.75, and 0.90, respectively). The weak identification test suggests that these four instruments are 
relevant and powerful: the F statistic for the joint explanatory power of the instrument variables 
is 303.29, significantly higher than the critical value of 13.96, as suggested in Stock, Wright, and 
Yogo (2002).    
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 report the second stage regression results. We find that 
predicted internal governance estimated from the first-stage regression is significant and 
negatively associated with RM1 and RM2 (t-statistic = -3.35 and -4.32, respectively). The result 
from the over-identification test of all instruments is insignificant (J-statistic = 5.197 and 5.499 
for the two columns, respectively), suggesting that the instruments are valid in the second stage 
regression.34  
                                                            
34 In an additional robustness test, we follow Larcker and Rusticus’s (2010) recommendation and conduct sensitivity 
analyses on the choice of instruments, and all the 2SLS test statistics are robust to using various subsets of the four 
instruments such as: 1) lagged and industry-year median internal governance and Outside_CEO; 2) lagged and 
industry-year median internal governance; 3) Outside_CEO and Named_Exec. 
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A Difference-in-differences Analysis 
As an alternative approach to address endogeneity concerns, we conduct a difference-in-
differences (DID) analysis. If the omitted correlated variables that affect both internal 
governance and the extent of real earnings management are time-invariant, they are controlled 
for in the DID analysis. Because the year-on-year change in executive horizon is 1 by 
construction and executive pay ratio is relatively sticky over time, we examine the change in one 
of the alternative measures of internal governance – key subordinate executives serving on other 
firms’ boards. In particular, we utilize a DID research design, as in Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) and Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2012), and examine the impact on real earnings 
management of the new appointment of key executives as independent directors on other firm’s 
boards. We construct two variables: 1) an indicator variable (CID_FIRM ) that equals one if the 
firm has at least one key executive who holds independent directorships in other firms during the 
sample period, and zero otherwise; 2) an indicator variable (POST_CID_FIRM ) that equals one 
for firm-years after the first key executive is appointed as an independent director in other firms, 
and zero otherwise.35 The coefficient on CID_FIRM captures the difference in real earnings 
management between firms with key subordinate executives being externally appointed as 
independent directors (i.e., treatment firm) and the other firms in the pre-appointment period. 
The coefficient on POST_CID_FIRM captures the incremental effect of CID_FIRM on real 
earnings management after the appointment of key executives as external independent director.36 
We do not include a separate variable for the post-appointment period as it is subsumed by the 
                                                            
35 There are only very few firms with two or more subordinate executives concurrently serving as independent 
directors on other firms’ boards.  
36 We exclude firm-years where the treatment firm becomes a non-treatment firm to have a cleaner set of treatment 
firms. In unreported analyses, our results are similar if we include these excluded firm-years in the analyses. In 
another robustness test, we restrict the treatment sample to firms with at least two pre-appointment years and at least 
two post-appointment years. Our inferences remain the same. 
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year fixed effects. (POST_CID_FIRM  is essentially the interaction between the CID_FIRM and 
an indicator for the post-appointment period.)  
Table 7 presents the result from this analysis. We observe a significant decrease in the 
extent of real earnings management after the appointment of the first key executive as 
independent directors in other firms; the coefficient on POST_CID_FIRM is significantly 
different from zero (t-statistic = -2.42 and -2.75, respectively).37 This result indicates that key 
subordinate executives have a causal effect on the extent of real earnings management after their 
appointment as independent directors in other firms, presumably as a result of the increase in 
their standing and influence within their own firms.  
Overall, the robust results based on the instrumental variable approach and the DID 
analysis strengthen our earlier inference that key executives exercise significant influence over 
real earnings management, mitigating concerns that our results are driven by omitted correlated 
variables. 
 
V. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES 
Research Design  
To test H2-H4, we estimate the following regression: 
ti,ti,
1-ti,ti,1-ti,
ti,1-ti,ti,
 + Year_FE +  EIndustry_F + olsFirm_Contr +
 lsCEO_Contro +ng_VARConditionianceInt_Govern +
  ng_VARConditioni anceInt_Govern +  =RM



ψ
γ

, (2) 
where Conditioning_VARi,t is a conditioning variable that moderates the association between a 
firm’s internal governance effectiveness and real earnings management. All other variables are 
defined as above. To preserve space, we focus on the two aggregate measures of real earnings 
                                                            
37 We also find that the coefficient on CID_FIRM is insignificantly different from zero; that is, there is no significant 
difference in the extent of real earnings management in the pre-appointment period between firms that have 
executives being appointed as external independent directors and those without. 
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management (RM1 and RM2) and the aggregate measure of the firm’s internal governance 
(Int_Governance). The estimation of regression (2) is similar to that of regression (1). To test 
H2, H3, and H4, Conditioning_VARi,t refers to proxies for key subordinate executives’ 
contribution to the firm’s performance, proxies for CEO power, and proxies for the benefit of 
meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, respectively. We explain the proxies below in the 
corresponding sections.  
The Conditioning Effect of Firm Complexity – Test of H2 
To test H2, we examine whether the effectiveness of internal governance in constraining 
real earnings management is stronger in firms where key subordinate executives’ contribution to 
the firm’s performance is expected to be higher. We expect key subordinate executives’ 
contribution to the firm’s performance to be more important when the firm operates in an R&D 
intensive industry where technological complexity is high and when the complexity surrounding 
operating in diverse geographical locations is high (e.g., Finkelstein 1992; Graham et al. 2013). 
We proxy for operation complexity using the following two measures: (1) an indicator for high 
R&D intensity (IND_RD), which equals one (zero) if the average R&D intensity in the industry-
year is above (below) the sample median; and (2) an indicator for high geographical complexity 
(GEO_Complexy), which equals one (zero) for firm-year observations with above (below) the 
median first principle component of the following three variables: the number of geographical 
segments, geographical sales concentration, and the percentage of foreign sales.38 To test H2, we 
replace Conditioning_VARi,t in Equation (2) with each of the two measures and we expect a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term. 
Table 8 reports the regression results. We find the association between internal governance 
                                                            
38 We do not combine IND_RD and GEO_Complexy into one common factor because unreported factor analysis 
results in two principle components with an eigenvalue greater than one, suggesting that these two measures appear 
to capture different constructs. 
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and the extent of real earnings management is significantly more negative for firms in industries 
with higher R&D intensity (Panel A, t-statistic = -2.58 and -2.90, respectively) and for firms 
with more diverse geographical operations (Panel B, t-statistic = -1.63 and -2.00, respectively). 
Overall, the results in Table 8 are consistent with hypothesis H2 that the impact of internal 
governance is stronger in more complex firms where key subordinate executives are expected to 
play a more important role in the firm’s operations. 
The Conditioning Effect of CEO Power – Test of H3 
H3 predicts that the effectiveness of internal governance is higher when CEOs are less 
powerful. We measure CEO power using three proxies. The first two measures are based on two 
commonly studied governance mechanisms: the monitoring by the board of directors and by 
institutional shareholders. We expect CEOs to be less powerful when other strong governance 
mechanisms are in place. Prior research documents that the effectiveness of board monitoring 
increases with board independence (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Klein 2002) and that institutional 
investors are better monitors than other shareholders (e.g., Bushee 1998; Parrino, Sias, and 
Starks 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007). Thus, we predict that the effectiveness of internal 
governance increases with board independence and institutional ownership, and we construct 
indicator variables that equal one (zero) if board independence (BD_IND) and institutional 
ownership (Inst_Own) are above (below) the corresponding sample median.39 The third proxy is 
based on CEO’s tenure and whether he is recruited from outside. We expect a CEO who is 
recently recruited from outside to be less experienced on his new position and thus less powerful. 
Hence, we create an indicator variable (New_OutsideCEO) that equals one if the CEO is 
                                                            
39 While the monitoring by the board of directors and institutional investors is probably the most commonly 
examined dimensions of corporate governance, there are other dimensions of corporate governance. Examining all 
possible dimensions of corporate governance is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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recruited from outside and the CEO’s tenure is less than three years, and zero otherwise.40, 41 To 
test H3, we replace Conditioning_VARi,t with one of these three proxies and we expect a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term in Equation (2). 
Table 9 presents the regression results. We find that the effectiveness of internal 
governance in constraining the extent of real earnings management is higher in firms with higher 
board independence (Panel A, t-statistic = -1.55 and -2.38, respectively), in firms with higher 
institutional ownership (Panel B, t-statistic = -1.58 and -1.52, respectively), and in firms with 
newly appointed outside CEOs (Panel C, t-statistic = -3.21 and -2.50, respectively). These results 
are consistent with hypothesis H3 that internal governance is more effective when CEOs are less 
powerful and that effective board oversight and higher institutional ownership can enhance key 
subordinate executives’ ability to monitor the CEO.42  
The Conditioning Effect of the Capital Markets Benefit of Meeting or Beating Earnings 
Targets – Test of H4 
Finally, we examine whether subordinate executives’ incentives to constrain real earnings 
management vary with the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings targets. We 
expect subordinate executives to have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings management 
when the capital markets benefit of reporting higher earnings is high because they will enjoy the 
benefit as well. We proxy for the benefits of reporting higher earnings using three measures: (1) 
an indicator variable (Distress) that equals one if the Z-score of the firm is lower than 1.81 and 
                                                            
40 We do not focus on CEO tenure solely because a newly-appointed CEO could have worked within the firm for 
many years and thus would be very experienced and knowledgeable about his new position. Therefore these CEOs 
are arguably powerful.  
41 Results are qualitatively similar when we use different tenure cutoffs around 3, such as 2.5 years or 3.5 years. 
42 This finding is also consistent with Acharya et al. (2011, 691) who analytically show that “a combination of 
internal governance and a rudimentary form of outside governance by shareholders can improve the efficiency of the 
firm dramatically.” By “rudimentary form of outside governance by shareholders,” they refer to shareholders’ ability 
to take over the firm and replace the CEO if necessary. That is, the effectiveness of internal governance can be 
enhanced by the monitoring by shareholders who care about long-term value and have the ability to discipline the 
CEO if needed. 
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the bond rating of the firm is below the investment grade, and zero otherwise; (2) an indicator 
variable (Hab_Beater) that equals one if the firm is a habitual beater (i.e., meeting or beating at 
least three out of the last four quarters, and at least six out of the last eight quarters), and zero 
otherwise; and (3) an indicator variable (Capital_Issue) that equals one if the firm has significant 
financing activities (i.e., issuing debt or equity greater than or equal to three percent of market 
value) in the following fiscal year, and zero otherwise.43 We expect the benefits of reporting 
higher earnings to be higher for firms with poor credit rating, for firms that are habitual 
benchmark beaters, and for firms with forthcoming financing activities, and hence we expect a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term in Equation (2).  
Table 10 presents the regression results. Consistent with H4, we find that internal 
governance is less effective in constraining real earnings management for firms in financial 
distress (Panel A, t-statistic = 1.90 and 2.22, respectively), for firms that are habitual beaters 
(Panel B, t-statistic = 1.95 and 1.58, respectively), and for firms with future financing activities 
(Panel C, t-statistic = 1.07 and 1.42, respectively). Overall, the results are consistent with 
hypothesis H4 that subordinate executives have weaker incentives to constrain real earnings 
management when the capital markets benefit to reporting higher earnings is greater. 
 
VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY CHECKS 
The Effectiveness of Internal Governance: Pre- versus Post-SOX Period 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, “SOX”), passed on July 30, 2002, aims at 
strengthening corporate governance and mitigating managerial incentives to manipulate earnings 
                                                            
43 We use a relatively high cutoff of three percent of market value to classify debt or equity issuance so that we can 
focus on instances where the benefits of reporting higher earnings are greater as well as to prevent misclassification 
of debt and equity issuance (e.g., issuing equity for employee stock options plans, debt conversion). Our results are 
robust to using other cutoffs between two percent to five percent of market value. 
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via accruals. Prior research (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008) finds that the passage of 
SOX and the increased regulatory scrutiny on accrual-based earnings management led many 
firms to switch from accrual to real earnings management. When CEOs switch to value-
decreasing real activities manipulations, we expect key subordinate executives to exert more 
influence over real earnings management in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. In 
addition, the passage of SOX increases the overall emphasis on corporate governance. Hence, 
key subordinate executives are likely to obtain greater support from other governance 
mechanisms, such as the board of directors, in the monitoring of the CEO, also leading to more 
effective internal governance. Note that as shown in Section V, internal governance and other 
governance mechanisms work as complements, rather than substitutes. As such, SOX represents 
an exogenous shock that affects the effectiveness of internal governance in reducing the extent of 
real earnings management: both the effectiveness of internal governance and the extent of real 
earnings management are increased, and we should observe stronger results in the post-SOX 
period. In contrast, if the results documented above are driven by endogenous (or optimal) 
decision of the firm, we should not observe any change in the effectiveness of internal 
governance.  
To test this prediction, we create an indicator variable (Post_SOX) that equals one if the 
fiscal year is after 2003, and zero otherwise, and replace Conditioning_VAR in Equation (2) with 
Post_SOX.44 Because of the inclusion of the Post_SOX variable, we cannot include year fixed-
effects; instead we include a time trend variable (Time), which is fiscal year minus 1993, the first 
fiscal year of the sample. The results are presented in Table 11. Consistent with our predictions, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative (t-statistic = -2.29 and -2.76, 
                                                            
44 We do not include observations in 2002 and 2003 in the post-SOX period because these two years are regarded as 
a transition period when many sections of SOX were not yet fully effective. The results are quantitatively similar if 
we include 2002 and 2003 in the post-SOX period. 
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respectively), implying that the effectiveness of internal governance in constraining real earnings 
management is strengthened in the post-SOX period.  
Self-Serving CEOs 
An implicit assumption in our hypothesis is that the CEO has private incentives to increase 
short-term performance at the expense of long-term value. This assumption is based on the 
findings in prior research. However, not all CEOs are the same and our results should be stronger 
in cases where the CEOs are particularly self-serving because subordinate executives have 
stronger incentives to constrain real earnings management when the CEOs are perceived to be 
more self-serving. In this section, we explore a setting where CEOs are more likely to be self-
serving. For this purpose, we rely on prior literature to identify instances where CEOs have 
greater career concerns and thus stronger incentives to manage earnings to report better financial 
performance. Parrino (1997) shows that it is easier to identify and replace poorly performing 
CEOs in homogeneous industries. Similarly, DeFond and Park (1999) show that market 
competition is likely to enhance the importance of accounting earnings in relative performance 
evaluation, and indeed they find that accounting-based measures are more associated with CEO 
turnover in industries with high competition. Following these arguments, we predict that CEOs 
in homogenous and competitive industries are more self-serving and have greater incentives to 
manage earnings for job security consideration.45 As such, internal governance is more effective 
for firms in such industries. To test our prediction, we create an indicator variable 
(Self_Serving_CEO) that equals one (zero) if the firm is in the more homogenous and 
competitive industries, which are classified based on the sample median of the first principle 
component of the industry homogeneity measure used in Parrino (1997) and the inverse of 
                                                            
45 On the other hand, Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that managerial slack is lower in competitive industries, which 
suggests that market competition improves firm governance and thus mitigates managerial self-serving behavior. 
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industry sales concentration ratio.  
Table 12 presents the regression results. As reported in this table, we find that consistent 
with our prediction, the negative effect of internal governance on real earning management is 
stronger in more homogenous and competitive industries (t-statistic = -4.09 and -3.94, 
respectively). 
The impact of internal governance when CEOs have incentives to engage in downward 
earnings management 
To triangulate our results, we identify a situation where CEOs have incentives to engage in 
downward earnings management and then test whether internal governance plays a less 
important role in constraining earnings management. The argument underlying H1 is that strong 
internal governance reduces upward real earnings management because such manipulation 
reduces long-term firm value. Presumably, if downward real earnings management does not have 
an adverse impact on long-term firm value, subordinate executives will not restrain the extent of 
real earnings management. It thus follows that internal governance plays a less important role in 
situation where CEOs have incentives to report lower earnings. Following prior research (e.g., 
McAnally et al. 2008), we use forthcoming fixed-date option grants to capture CEOs’ incentives 
to engage in downward earnings management. McAnally et al. (2008) find that CEOs have 
incentives to miss earnings targets prior to fixed-date option grants, because CEOs profit from a 
reduced option strike price if the firm’s stock price decreases after missing earnings targets.46 
Following McAnally et al. (2008), we create an indicator variable (Future_Option_Grant) that 
equals one if the one-year ahead fixed-date option grants scaled by salary after the earnings 
announcement is greater than the sample median and the firm misses analyst forecast by a small 
                                                            
46 We focus on fixed-date option grants because the grant dates of these options are known and thus managers 
cannot time or backdate the options (McAnally et al. 2008). 
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margin (less than 0.5 percent of stock price) or a really large margin (more than 10 percent of 
stock price), and zero otherwise.47 We predict the negative effect of internal governance to be 
weaker, or the coefficient on the interaction term of internal governance and 
Future_Option_Grant to be positive.  
Table 13 presents the regression results. As predicted, we find that the negative effect of 
internal governance on real earning management is significantly attenuated when CEOs have 
large forthcoming fixed-date option grants (t-statistic = 2.05 and 2.12, respectively). Moreover, 
the F-test indicates that the net effect of internal governance (β1 + β2) is insignificant; that is, 
internal governance is not associated with the extent of real earnings management for the firms 
with large forthcoming fixed-date option grants. These results corroborate our evidence that 
internal governance only plays an important role in constraining upward earnings management.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examine whether key subordinate executives have the incentive and 
ability to constrain the extent of real earnings management. Compared to the CEO, key 
subordinate executives are usually younger, have longer horizon, and care more about future 
performance. Also, key subordinate executives have the ability to influence CEOs’ decisions 
because of their significant involvement in the firm’s operations as well as their contribution to 
the firm’s current performance, which are important to the CEO. Using the number of years to 
retirement to capture key subordinate executives’ incentives and their compensation relative to 
the CEO’s to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings 
management decreases with key subordinate executives’ horizon and influence. Our results are 
                                                            
47 Because we are interested in the firms where managers have the incentives to manage earnings downward and 
benefit from missing earnings targets (i.e., reduction in option strike price prior to option grants), we examine the 
full sample in this set of analysis.  
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robust to alternative measures of key subordinate executives’ ability to influence corporate 
decisions: the abnormal compensation of subordinate executives and the number of directorships 
in other firms held by these executives. Our inferences also remain the same after we control for 
potential endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable approach and a difference-in-
differences approach. 
We then examine whether the impact of internal governance varies with proxies for key 
subordinate executives’ contribution, proxies for CEO power, and proxies for capital markets 
benefit of meeting earnings benchmarks. We find that the effect of internal governance is 
stronger in more complex firms where key subordinate executives play a more important role, 
stronger in firms where the CEO is less powerful, and weaker in firms where the capital markets 
benefit of meeting earnings benchmark is higher. We conduct a series of additional tests to 
ensure the robustness of our results and to provide additional insights. First, we find that our 
results are stronger in the post-SOX period when real earnings management is likely more 
prevalent than in the pre-SOX period. Second, we find that internal governance is more effective 
in constraining real earnings management for firms where CEOs presumably have greater career 
concerns and thus have more incentives to manage earnings to report a better financial 
performance. Lastly, we find that the effect of internal governance is weaker for firms with large 
forthcoming fixed-date option grants, where CEOs presumably have incentives to manage 
earnings downward to reduce the exercise price of the option grants.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of internal governance on the 
extent of real earnings management. This examination is important because it sheds light on how 
the members of the management team work together to shape financial reporting. Unlike prior 
research that generally views executives as a unified team, this paper provides evidence that 
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subordinate executives can provide an important monitoring role on the CEOs from the bottom 
up and that effective internal governance can reduce the extent of real earnings management. 
This paper differs from and complements studies on the impact of CFO characteristics on accrual 
quality or the likelihood of earnings restatements/frauds by focusing on all subordinate 
executives and by focusing on real earnings management.   
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APPENDIX 
Variables Definition 
 
BD_IND An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is 
above (below) the median percentage of independent director. 
B/M The book to market ratio in the current fiscal year, defined as book value 
of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F). 
Capital_Issue An indicator variable that equals one if the firm issues debt or equity 
greater than or equals three percent of market value in the following fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise.   
CEO_Comp The CEO’s logged total compensation in the prior fiscal year. 
CEO_Horizon CEO’s decision horizon, defined as retirement age of 65 minus the age of 
the CEO. 
CEO_PPS The normalized pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity in the prior fiscal year, measured similarly to Core and Guay 
(2002). 
CID_FIRM An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has at least one key 
executive that serves as an independent director on other firms’ boards 
during the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
POST_CID_FIRM An indicator variable that equals one for firm-years after the key executive 
is appointed as an independent director in other firms, and zero otherwise. 
Distress An indicator variable that equals one if the Z-score of the firm is less than 
1.81 and the bond rating of the firm is below investment grade, and zero 
otherwise. 
Exec_Abcomp Subordinate executives’ abnormal compensation, calculated as the logged 
(1 + abnormal compensation + sample minimum abnormal compensation), 
where abnormal compensation is the residual from a regression of 
executives’ mean total compensation on known determinants of CEO Pay 
(logged sales, S&P500 membership, book-to-market, returns and lagged 
returns, ROA and lagged ROA, and industry and year fixed effects). 
Exec_Horizon Subordinate executives’ decision horizon, defined as retirement age of 65 
minus the average age of other executives. 
Exec_PayRatio Subordinate executives’ pay ratio, calculated as the average total 
compensation of subordinate executives scaled by the CEO’s total 
compensation, measured in the prior fiscal year. 
Firm_Age The age of the firm, defined as the number of years since the firm’s stock 
returns is first reported in the monthly stock files of CRSP. 
Future_Option_ An indicator that equals one if the one-year ahead fixed-date option grant  
Grant scaled by salary after the earnings announcement is greater than the 
sample median and the firm misses analyst forecast by a small margin 
(less than 0.5 percent of stock price) or a large margin (more than 10 
percent of stock price), and zero otherwise. 
GEO_Complexy An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is 
above (below) the median first principle component of the following three 
variables: 1) number of geographical segments; 2) geographical sales 
concentration and; 3) percentage of foreign sales. 
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Hab_Beater An indicator variable that equals one if the firm meets or beats earnings 
targets at least three out of the last four quarters, and at least six out of the 
last eight quarters, and zero otherwise. 
IND_RD An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the average R&D intensity 
in the industry-year is above (below) the sample median. 
Ind-Year-Median_ The industry-year median value of internal governance. 
Int_Governance 
Inst_Own An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is 
above (below) the median institutional ownership. 
Int_Governance Firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. 
Lagged_Int_ The one-year lagged value of internal governance. 
Governance 
Leverage The leverage ratio in the current fiscal year, defined as total liabilities (AT 
– CEQ) divided by total assets (AT). 
N_Analyst The number of analysts following the firm in the current fiscal year, 
obtained from I/B/E/S. 
Named_Exec The number of named executives in the annual proxy statement besides 
the CEO in the prior fiscal year. 
New_OutsideCEO An indicator equals one if the CEO is recruited from outside and the 
CEO’s tenure is less than three years, zero otherwise. 
Other_Director The number of independent directorships in other firms held by key 
subordinate executives. 
Outside_CEO An indicator variable that equals one if the current CEO is recruited from 
outside, and zero otherwise. 
Post_SOX An indicator variable that equals one if fiscal year is 2002 and onward, 
and zero otherwise. 
RM_CFO Negative of the residual from the cash flow from operations (CFO) model:	
ܥܨ ௜ܱ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߙଵ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ
ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷ
Δܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
The model is estimated by industry (at the Fama-French 48 industry level) 
and year and requires at least ten observations for each industry-year 
combination, using firms from the ExecuComp universe. 
RM_DISX Negative of the residual from the discretionary expenses (DISX) model: 
ܦܫܵ ௜ܺ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߙଵ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ
ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷ
Δܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 The model is estimated by industry (at the Fama-French 48 industry level) 
and year and requires at least ten observations for each industry-year 
combination, using firms from the ExecuComp universe. 
RM_PROD The residual from production Costs (PROD) model: 
ܴܱܲܦ௜௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߙଵ
1
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶ
ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଷ
Δܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙସ
Δܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧ିଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
PROD is defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) and the 
change in inventory (ΔINVT). The model is estimated by industry (at the 
Fama-French 48 industry level) and year and requires at least ten 
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observations for each industry-year combination, using firms from the 
ExecuComp universe. 
RM1 An aggregate measure of real earnings management, defined as the sum of 
RM_PROD and RM_DISX. 
RM2 An aggregate measure of real earnings management, defined as the sum of 
RM_CFO and RM_DISX. 
ROA Return on assets in the current fiscal year, defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB), scaled by beginning total assets (AT). 
Self_Serving_CEO An indicator variable that equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is 
above (below) the median first principle component of the following two 
variables: 1) industry homogeneity based on Parrino (1997) and; 2) 
industry competition based on the inverse of industry sales concentration 
ratio. 
Size Firm size, calculated as the logged value of total assets (AT) in the current 
fiscal year. 
Time A time trend variable which equals the difference between the current 
fiscal year and 1993. 
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 TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Obs.
Total number of firm-year observations from 1993-2011 with Compustat, 
Execucomp and I/B/E/S data 23,647 
Less: financials and utilities firms (5,133)
Less: missing values for variables used in the regressions (6,520)
Final sample 11,994 
Number of unique firms 2,005 
Panel B: Titles of Key Subordinate Executives 
Title Obs.   %
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 9,556  19.92 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) 5,245  10.93 
President 6,888  14.36 
Executive Vice President 7,361  15.34 
Senior Vice President 7,347  15.31 
Vice President 6,543  13.64 
Others 5,036  10.50 
Total 47,976  100.00 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3
RM_CFO 11,994 -0.002 -0.002 0.084 -0.047 0.041
RM_PROD 11,994 -0.003 0.002 0.173 -0.092 0.087
RM_DISX 11,994 -0.002 0.009 0.184 -0.083 0.094
RM1 11,994 -0.006 0.010 0.336 -0.162 0.168
RM2 11,994 -0.004 0.005 0.202 -0.101 0.102
Exec_Horizon 11,994 12.697 13.000 6.462 9.000 17.000
Exec_PayRatio 11,994 0.558 0.436 0.514 0.324 0.596
Int_Governance 11,994 0.000 -0.132 1.468 -0.782 0.578
CEO_Horizon 11,994 9.496 10.000 7.800 5.000 15.000
CEO_Comp 11,994 7.867 7.848 1.075 7.095 8.610
CEO_PPS 11,994 0.285 0.211 0.236 0.106 0.393
Firm_Age 11,994 22.941 17.000 18.796 9.000 31.000
N_Analyst 11,994 11.070 9.000 7.833 5.000 15.000
ROA 11,994 0.055 0.061 0.105 0.022 0.105
Size 11,994 7.345 7.180 1.518 6.244 8.324
B/M 11,994 0.505 0.424 0.382 0.261 0.649
Leverage 11,994 0.512 0.514 0.218 0.357 0.645
              
Notes to Table 1: 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from operations. RM_PROD is a 
real earnings management proxy that negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy 
that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. 
Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability 
to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the 
standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is 
the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is 
the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year.  
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TABLE 2 
Pearson Correlation Table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 RM_CFO 1.00 
2 RM_PROD 0.43 1.00 
3 RM_DISX 0.00 0.75 1.00 
4 RM1 0.22 0.93 0.94 1.00 
5 RM2 0.42 0.87 0.90 0.95 1.00 
6 Exec_Horizon 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 
7 Exec_PayRatio 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 1.00 
8 Int_Governance 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.73 0.73 1.00 
9 CEO_Horizon 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.16 0.05 0.15 1.00 
10 CEO_Comp -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.45 -0.34 -0.03 1.00 
11 CEO_PPS -0.13 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.12 0.28 0.28 -0.06 0.05 1.00 
12 Firm_Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.26 -0.13 -0.27 -0.18 0.29 -0.13 1.00 
13 N_Analyst -0.19 -0.12 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.43 0.25 0.15 1.00 
14 ROA -0.49 -0.29 0.06 -0.12 -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.20 1.00 
15 Size -0.04 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.17 -0.07 -0.16 -0.11 0.66 0.14 0.46 0.62 0.06 1.00 
16 B/M 0.23 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.18 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 -0.01 -0.27 -0.31 -0.07 1.00 
17 Leverage 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 0.21 -0.17 0.23 0.02 -0.26 0.37 -0.11 1.00 
                                      
Notes to Table 2: 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings management proxy that 
negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate 
measures of real earnings management. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to 
influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and 
Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets 
in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is 
the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. All correlations except those in shaded cells are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
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TABLE 3 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management 
Panel A: Key Executives' Decision Horizon, Power and Real Earnings Management 
Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
H1 RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1 RM2 
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Exec_Horizon ―  -0.010 -0.66 -0.108 -2.45 *** -0.142 -2.90 *** -0.248 -2.75 *** -0.142 -2.69 *** 
Exec_PayRatio ―  -0.308 -1.46 * -2.283 -3.92 *** -2.762 -3.81 *** -5.108 -4.06 *** -3.010 -4.13 *** 
CEO_Horizon 0.006 0.45 -0.045 -1.19 -0.097 -2.04 ** -0.144 -1.74 * -0.093 -1.98 ** 
CEO_Comp -0.351 -2.34 ** -2.120 -4.07 *** -2.536 -4.54 *** -4.726 -4.51 *** -2.906 -5.08 *** 
CEO_PPS -0.008 -0.02 0.901 0.61 -0.212 -0.12 0.808 0.25 -0.241 -0.12 
Firm_Age 0.006 1.13 -0.069 -3.43 *** -0.083 -3.67 *** -0.152 -3.65 *** -0.076 -3.19 *** 
N_Analyst -0.132 -7.06 *** -0.344 -5.97 *** -0.367 -6.01 *** -0.716 -6.26 *** -0.497 -7.67 *** 
ROA -33.550 -16.20 *** -36.110 -9.49 *** 21.710 5.58 *** -14.840 -2.12 ** -14.610 -3.37 *** 
Size 0.404 3.11 *** 3.169 7.16 *** 3.620 7.74 *** 6.858 7.82 *** 4.000 8.35 *** 
B/M 2.429 7.11 *** 6.357 6.16 *** 5.430 6.06 *** 11.810 6.27 *** 7.486 7.32 *** 
Leverage 4.724 7.31 *** 5.377 2.80 *** 4.461 2.16 ** 9.788 2.62 *** 8.865 4.38 *** 
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.139 0.060 0.078 0.100 
Observations 11,994 11,994 11,994 11,994 11,994 
Panel B: Overall Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management 
Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
H1 RM_CFO RM_PROD RM_DISX RM1 RM2 
Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance ―  -0.102 -1.36 * -0.893 -4.26 *** -1.124 -4.63 *** -2.021 -4.61 *** -1.174 -4.49 *** 
CEO_Horizon 0.006 0.45 -0.045 -1.19 -0.096 -2.04 ** -0.143 -1.74 * -0.092 -1.98 ** 
CEO_Comp -0.307 -2.06 ** -1.902 -4.22 *** -2.306 -4.94 *** -4.256 -4.80 *** -2.616 -5.37 *** 
CEO_PPS -0.041 -0.10 0.736 0.49 -0.385 -0.21 0.455 0.14 -0.460 -0.23 
Firm_Age 0.006 1.09 -0.070 -3.52 *** -0.085 -3.76 *** -0.155 -3.74 *** -0.077 -3.29 *** 
N_Analyst -0.132 -7.03 *** -0.345 -5.98 *** -0.368 -6.02 *** -0.718 -6.27 *** -0.498 -7.68 *** 
ROA -33.530 -16.16 *** -36.010 -9.46 *** 21.820 5.59 *** -14.610 -2.09 ** -14.470 -3.33 *** 
Size 0.384 3.11 *** 3.070 7.09 *** 3.516 7.79 *** 6.646 7.79 *** 3.869 8.29 *** 
B/M 2.438 7.22 *** 6.403 6.17 *** 5.479 6.05 *** 11.900 6.27 *** 7.547 7.32 *** 
Leverage 4.730 7.32 *** 5.405 2.81 *** 4.491 2.17 ** 9.848 2.63 *** 8.902 4.39 *** 
Industry and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.139 0.060 0.078 0.100 
Observations 11,994 11,994 11,994 11,994 11,994 
  
 
58 
 
TABLE 3 (Cont’d) 
Notes to Table 3: 
RM_CFO is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects cash flow from operations. RM_PROD is a real earnings management proxy that 
negatively affects production. RM_DISX is a real earnings management proxy that negatively affects discretionary expenses. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate 
measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon is the 
subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall 
internal governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of 
the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in 
the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are 
corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 4 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management – Partitioned by Suspect and 
Non-Suspect Firms 
Panel A: Suspect Firms 
 (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance ―  -1.857 -3.83 *** -1.229 -4.37 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.125 -1.38 -0.086 -1.71 * 
CEO_Comp  -4.725 -4.54 *** -2.967 -5.24 ***
CEO_PPS -0.376 -0.10 -0.781 -0.34 
Firm_Age  -0.169 -3.61 *** -0.086 -3.28 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.653 -5.20 *** -0.471 -6.55 *** 
ROA  -26.550 -2.44 ** -19.240 -3.03 *** 
Size  6.573 7.05 *** 3.892 7.43 *** 
B/M  18.070 5.58 *** 11.590 6.22 *** 
Leverage  14.050 2.86 *** 11.160 4.09 *** 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.095 0.117 
Observations  7,701 7,701 
Panel B: Non-Suspect Firms 
 (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance ―  -0.994 -1.26 -0.329 -0.81 
CEO_Horizon  -0.123 -0.83 -0.068 -0.88 
CEO_Comp  -1.677 -1.19 -1.048 -1.35 
CEO_PPS 5.025 0.78 1.712 0.46 
Firm_Age  -0.135 -2.66 *** -0.065 -2.32 ** 
N_Analyst  -0.736 -3.31 *** -0.470 -3.88 *** 
ROA  7.187 0.93 -3.661 -0.87 
Size  4.481 3.09 *** 2.451 3.66 *** 
B/M  7.076 4.84 *** 4.421 4.25 *** 
Leverage  10.430 1.87 * 10.080 3.51 *** 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.051 0.053 
Observations  1,803 1,803 
  
Notes to Table 4: 
Suspect firms are firm-years with earnings surprise between 0 and 1 percent of stock price, while Non-Suspect 
firms are firm-years with earnings surprise less than -0.5 percent of stock price or more than 1 percent of stock 
price. RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings 
management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal 
governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio.  
CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS 
is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. 
N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. 
Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current 
fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, 
two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 5 
 Alternative Measure of Key Executives' Influence and Real Earnings Management 
Panel A:Key Executives' Abnormal Compensation 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Exec_Horizon ―  -0.219 -2.11 ** -0.150 -2.50 *** 
Exec_AbComp ―  -4.807 -1.77 ** -3.781 -2.26 ** 
Int_Governance ―  -1.268 -2.73 *** -0.925 -3.29 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.165 -1.82 * -0.109 -2.18 ** -0.166 -1.83 * -0.109 -2.19 ** 
CEO_Comp  -2.508 -2.76 *** -1.453 -2.86 *** -2.433 -2.64 *** -1.432 -2.77 *** 
CEO_PPS -1.326 -0.34 -1.305 -0.55 -1.317 -0.34 -1.302 -0.55 
Firm_Age  -0.165 -3.49 *** -0.085 -3.14 *** -0.165 -3.49 *** -0.084 -3.13 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.652 -5.09 *** -0.474 -6.38 *** -0.652 -5.09 *** -0.475 -6.38 *** 
ROA  -24.560 -2.14 ** -18.420 -2.70 *** -24.620 -2.15 ** -18.430 -2.70 ***
Size  5.825 6.12 *** 3.397 6.41 *** 5.820 6.11 *** 3.395 6.40 *** 
B/M  19.190 5.86 *** 12.280 6.49 *** 19.220 5.85 *** 12.290 6.47 ***
Leverage  15.560 3.22 *** 11.860 4.31 *** 15.490 3.21 *** 11.840 4.30 *** 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.094 0.118 0.094 0.118 
Observations  7,441 7,441 7,441 7,441 
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) 
Panel B:Key Executives' Independent Directorships in Other Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Exec_Horizon ―  -0.224 -2.16 ** -0.154 -2.57 *** -0.207 -2.00 ** -0.143 -2.39 *** 
Other_Director ―  -2.059 -2.44 *** -1.281 -2.55 *** -2.022 -2.44 *** -1.258 -2.57 *** 
Exec_PayRatio ―  -5.321 -3.86 *** -3.394 -4.39 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.143 -1.56 -0.097 -1.91 * -0.128 -1.40 -0.087 -1.74 * 
CEO_Comp  -3.371 -3.56 *** -2.070 -4.00 *** -5.392 -4.65 *** -3.359 -5.27 *** 
CEO_PPS -2.270 -0.60 -2.011 -0.88 -0.067 -0.02 -0.606 -0.27 
Firm_Age  -0.158 -3.39 *** -0.080 -3.03 *** -0.162 -3.49 *** -0.083 -3.14 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.674 -5.39 *** -0.484 -6.76 *** -0.646 -5.21 *** -0.466 -6.59 *** 
ROA  -25.790 -2.35 ** -18.740 -2.93 *** -26.740 -2.47 ** -19.350 -3.06 *** 
Size  6.250 6.55 *** 3.668 6.72 *** 7.012 7.24 *** 4.155 7.61 *** 
B/M  18.330 5.61 *** 11.760 6.25 *** 17.770 5.49 *** 11.410 6.08 *** 
Leverage  14.200 2.90 *** 11.270 4.13 *** 13.780 2.81 *** 11.000 4.05 *** 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.093 0.115 0.097 0.118 
Observations  7,701 7,701 7,701 7,701 
Notes to Table 5: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. 
Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. Exec_AbComp is the logged (1 + abnormal compensation + sample minimum abnormal compensation), where 
abnormal compensation is defined as the residual from a regression of executives’ mean total compensation on known determinants of CEO Pay (logged sales, S&P500 
membership, book-to-market, returns and lagged returns, ROA and lagged ROA, and industry and year fixed effects). Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal 
governance, measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_AbComp. Other_Director is the number of independent directorships in other firms 
held by key subordinate executives. Exec_PayRatio is the subordinate executives’ ability to influence the CEO. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is 
the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the 
number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-
to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
(Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a 
prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).
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TABLE 6 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management - Instrumental Variables (2SLS) 
Approach 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pred. Int_Governance RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Predicted_Int_Governance ―  -3.075 -3.35 *** -2.225 -4.32 *** 
CEO_Horizon  0.000 -0.15 -0.154 -1.64 -0.080 -1.56 
CEO_Comp  -0.471 -14.66 *** -5.466 -4.41 *** -3.584 -5.16 *** 
CEO_PPS 0.568 6.76 *** 0.325 0.07 0.041 0.02 
Firm_Age  -0.004 -3.42 *** -0.179 -3.53 *** -0.090 -3.17 *** 
N_Analyst  0.009 2.70 *** -0.574 -4.03 *** -0.434 -5.24 *** 
ROA  -0.048 -0.19 -30.500 -2.33 ** -22.440 -2.84 *** 
Size  0.137 5.46 *** 6.760 6.33 *** 4.082 6.93 *** 
B/M  -0.096 -1.22 17.930 5.49 *** 11.200 5.90 *** 
Leverage  -0.062 -0.45 15.250 3.00 *** 11.710 4.16 *** 
Lagged_Int_Governance  0.559 27.46 *** 
Ind-Year-Median_Int_Governance  0.464 9.70 *** 
Outside_CEO  0.103 2.75 *** 
Named_Exec  0.014 0.90 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.571 0.109 0.136 
Observations  5,611 5,611 5,611 
  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  303.29 *** 303.29 *** 
(Weak identification test)  
Hansen J-statistic  5.197 5.499 
(Over-identification test of all instr.)  
  
Notes to Table 6: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. CEO_Horizon is the 
CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the 
number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged 
value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Lagged_Int_Governance is the one-year lagged value of 
internal governance. Ind-Year-Median_Int_Governance is the industry-year median value of internal 
governance. Outside_CEO is an indicator equals one if the current CEO is recruited from outside, and zero 
otherwise. Named_Exec is the number of named executives in the annual proxy statement besides the CEO.  
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed 
test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 7 
Real Earnings Management surrounding the New External Appointment of 
Subordinate Executives as Independent Directors 
 (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Exec_Horizon ―  -0.272 -2.73 *** -0.178 -3.11 *** 
CID_Firm  1.925 0.75 1.433 1.01 
Post_CID_Firm ―  -5.079 -2.42 *** -3.243 -2.75 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.100 -1.07 -0.071 -1.36 
CEO_Comp  -3.560 -3.68 *** -2.199 -4.27 *** 
CEO_PPS -2.662 -0.68 -2.192 -0.93 
Firm_Age  -0.130 -2.76 *** -0.063 -2.39 ** 
N_Analyst  -0.759 -5.98 *** -0.534 -7.19 *** 
ROA  -20.560 -1.77 * -15.660 -2.34 ** 
Size  6.648 6.66 *** 3.893 6.72 *** 
B/M  17.680 5.50 *** 11.310 6.41 *** 
Leverage  12.420 2.38 ** 10.140 3.54 *** 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.091 0.111 
Observations  6,675 6,675 
  
Notes to Table 7: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Exec_Horizon is the subordinate executives’ decision horizon. 
CID_Firm is an indicator equals one if the firm has at least one key executive who holds independent 
directorships in other firms during the sample period, and zero otherwise. Post_CID_Firm is an indicator equals 
one for firm-years after the key executive is appointed as an independent director in other firms, and zero 
otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. 
CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the 
firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal 
year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the 
current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, 
two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 8 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on Key Executives’ 
Contribution 
Panel A: Industry Research and Development Intensity 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H2 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -0.449 -0.78 -0.395 -1.18 
IND_RD  -2.005 -2.16 ** -1.335 -2.26 ** 
Int_Governance × IND_RD ―  -2.688 -2.58 *** -1.592 -2.90 *** 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.098 0.120 
Observations  7,700 7,700 
Panel B: Factor Analysis of Geographical Operating Complexity 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H2 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.012 -1.79 * -0.638 -1.95 * 
GEO_Complexy  -7.971 -4.11 *** -4.654 -4.08 *** 
Int_Governance × GEO_Complexy ―  -1.599 -1.63 * -1.142 -2.00 ** 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.105 0.127 
Observations  7,701 7,701 
Notes to Table 8: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. IND_RD is indicator 
equals one (zero) if the average R&D intensity in the industry year is above (below) the sample median. 
GEO_Complexy is an indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median first 
principle component of the following three variables: 1) number of geographical segments; 2) geographical 
sales concentration and; 3) percentage of foreign sales. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the 
firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the 
current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; 
Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 9 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on CEO Power 
Panel A: Board Independence 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H3 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.419 -2.46 ** -0.902 -2.71 *** 
BD_IND  -5.782 -4.53 *** -3.493 -4.67 *** 
Int_Governance × BD_IND ―  -1.111 -1.55 * -0.953 -2.38 ***
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.108 0.132 
Observations  4,796 4,796 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H3 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.669 -2.49 ** -1.189 -3.31 *** 
Inst_Own  1.080 0.71 1.083 1.26 
Int_Governance × Inst_Own ―  -1.398 -1.58 * -0.763 -1.52 * 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.102 0.127 
Observations  6,731 6,731 
Panel C: New Outside CEO 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H3 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.217 -2.36 ** -0.871 -2.98 ***
New_OutsideCEO  -2.906 -0.99 -1.400 -0.83 
Int_Governance × New_OutsideCEO ―  -3.703 -3.21 *** -1.858 -2.50 *** 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.095 0.118 
Observations  7,181 7,181 
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TABLE 9 (Cont’d) 
Notes to Table 9: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. BD_IND is an indicator 
equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median percentage of independent director. 
Inst_Own is an indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median institutional 
ownership. New_OutsideCEO is an indicator equals one if the CEO is recruited from outside and the CEO’s 
tenure is less than three years, zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the 
CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of 
equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the 
return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is 
the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed 
test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 10 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on the Benefits of 
Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations 
Panel A: Financial distress 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H4 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.840 -3.57 *** -1.232 -4.13 *** 
Distress  -2.166 -0.97 -0.717 -0.51 
Int_Governance × Distress +  2.747 1.90 ** 1.786 2.22 ** 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.092 0.115 
Observations  7,465 7,465 
Panel B: Habitual Beater 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H4 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -3.003 -3.93 *** -1.768 -3.98 *** 
Hab_Beater  2.194 1.82 * 1.218 1.87 * 
Int_Governance × Hab_Beater +  1.519 1.95 ** 0.742 1.58 * 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.097 0.118 
Observations  7,234 7,234 
Panel C: Debt or Equity Issuance 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
 H4 RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -2.047 -3.82 *** -1.374 -4.50 *** 
Capital_Issue  3.784 3.58 *** 2.204 3.59 *** 
Int_Governance × Capital_Issue +  0.717 1.07 0.561 1.42 * 
  
Controls  YES YES 
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.097 0.119 
Observations  7,701 7,701 
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TABLE 10 (Cont’d) 
Notes to Table 10: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Distress is an indicator 
equals one if the Z-score of the firm is less than 1.81 and the bond rating of the firm is below investment grade, 
and zero otherwise. Hab_Beater is an indicator equals one if the firm has meet or beat at least three out of the 
last four quarters, and at least six out of the last eight quarters, and zero otherwise. Capital_Issue is an indicator 
equals one if the firm issues debt or equity greater than or equals three percent of market value in the following 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged 
total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. 
Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on 
assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the 
book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard 
errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test 
where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise).  
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TABLE 11 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on the passage of 
SOX 
  (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  -1.171 -2.38 ** -0.775 -2.91 *** 
Post_SOX  -2.721 -1.02 -1.519 -0.98 
Int_Governance × Post_SOX ―  -1.547 -2.29 ** -1.114 -2.76 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.126 -1.33 -0.083 -1.61 
CEO_Comp  -4.990 -4.35 *** -3.153 -5.01 *** 
CEO_PPS -1.306 -0.32 -1.449 -0.59 
Firm_Age  -0.175 -3.77 *** -0.092 -3.49 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.657 -5.19 *** -0.470 -6.41 *** 
ROA  -33.350 -3.49 *** -22.170 -3.74 *** 
Size  6.748 6.93 *** 4.035 7.37 *** 
B/M  15.830 4.76 *** 10.350 5.33 *** 
Leverage  13.690 2.74 *** 10.890 3.91 *** 
Time  0.062 0.29 0.018 0.14 
  
Industry FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.097 0.118 
Observations  6,929 6,929 
  
Notes to Table 11: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Post_SOX is an indicator 
equals one if fiscal year is on or after 2002, and zero otherwise. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the 
firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the 
current fiscal year. Time is a time trend variable which equals to the difference between the current fiscal year 
and 1993. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et 
al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively 
(one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 12 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on Self-serving 
CEOs 
 (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance  0.263 0.41 -0.023 -0.06 
Self_Serving_CEO  3.607 1.05 1.809 0.95 
Int_Governance × Self_Serving_CEO ―  -3.835 -4.09 *** -2.182 -3.94 *** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.150 -1.63 -0.100 -2.00 ** 
CEO_Comp  -4.806 -4.64 *** -3.021 -5.36 *** 
CEO_PPS -0.367 -0.10 -0.747 -0.33 
Firm_Age  -0.165 -3.42 *** -0.084 -3.11 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.689 -5.44 *** -0.492 -6.74 *** 
ROA  -27.800 -2.58 *** -19.870 -3.14 *** 
Size  6.838 7.31 *** 4.033 7.71 *** 
B/M  17.740 5.57 *** 11.420 6.15 *** 
Leverage  13.560 2.73 *** 11.020 3.97 *** 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.103 0.124 
Observations  7,601 7,601 
  
Notes to Table 12: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Self_Serving_CEO is an 
indicator equals one (zero) if the firm-year observation is above (below) the median first principle component of 
the following two variables: 1) industry homogeneity based on Parrino (1997) and; 2) industry competition 
based on the inverse of industry sales concentration ratio. CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. 
CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the 
CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the 
firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. Size is the logged value of total assets in the current 
fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the 
current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; 
Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, two-tailed test otherwise). 
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TABLE 13 
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management conditioning on Future Option 
Grants 
 (1) (2) 
 Pred. RM1 RM2 
  Coef. t-stats Coef. t-stats 
Int_Governance (β1)  -2.081 -4.75 *** -1.206 -4.61 *** 
Future_Option_Grant  0.518 0.25 0.270 0.22 
Int_Governance × Future_Option_Grant (β2) +  2.939 2.05 ** 1.571 2.12 ** 
CEO_Horizon  -0.141 -1.71 * -0.091 -1.95 * 
CEO_Comp  -4.275 -4.81 *** -2.625 -5.38 *** 
CEO_PPS 0.458 0.14 -0.458 -0.23 
Firm_Age  -0.155 -3.74 *** -0.077 -3.29 *** 
N_Analyst  -0.716 -6.29 *** -0.497 -7.72 *** 
ROA  -14.640 -2.09 ** -14.480 -3.33 *** 
Size  6.662 7.77 *** 3.878 8.27 *** 
B/M  11.890 6.25 *** 7.539 7.28 *** 
Leverage  9.846 2.63 *** 8.900 4.39 *** 
  
Industry and Year FE  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  0.078 0.100 
Observations  11,994 11,994 
  
F-test of β1 + β2 = 0  0.35 0.23 
  
Notes to Table 13: 
RM1 and RM2 are aggregate measures of real earnings management. All measures of real earnings management 
are multiplied by 100 for the ease of exposition. Int_Governance is the firm’s overall internal governance, 
measured as the sum of the standardized value of Exec_Horizon and Exec_PayRatio. Future_Option_Grant is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the one-year ahead fixed-date option grant scaled by salary after the 
earnings announcement is greater than the sample median and the firm misses analyst forecast by a small margin 
(less than 0.5 percent of stock price) or a large margin (more than 10 percent of stock price), and zero otherwise. 
CEO_Horizon is the CEO’s decision horizon. CEO_Comp is the CEO’s logged total compensation. CEO_PPS 
is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s portfolio of equity. Firm_Age is the age of the firm. 
N_Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm. ROA is the return on assets in the current fiscal year. 
Size is the logged value of total assets in the current fiscal year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio in the current 
fiscal year. Leverage is the leverage ratio in the current fiscal year. Standard errors are corrected for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (one-tailed test where there is a prediction, 
two-tailed test otherwise). 
 
 
